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INTRODUCTION
One of the hallmarks of a free society is the ongoing endeavor to find an
appropriate balance between governmental power and individual liberties.
During the last several years, however, in the corporate legal arena this balance
has shifted in a way that profoundly impacts individuals caught up in the web of
corporate investigations. Since 1990 the number of federal prosecutions of
business entities has risen dramatically' as prosecutors have increasingly utilized
1. See Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal Ethics, Professionalism and the
Employee Interview, 2003 COLLJM. Bus. L. REv. 859, 874-80 (2003) [hereinafter Employee Interview]. See
generally KATLEEN F. BRICKEY, CoRr'oRATrE CRIMINAL LIABiLrry § 1:01 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2004); John S.
Baker, Jr., Jurisdictional and Separation of Powers Strategies to Limit the Expansion of Federal Crimes, 52 AM.
U. L. REv. 545, 546 (2005) (noting "explosive growth of federal crimes"). According to the Department of
Justice, during the five-year period from July 2002 through July 2007, the Corporate Fraud Task Force, see infra
note 42 and accompanying text, has obtained 1,236 corporate fraud convictions. Press Release, United States
Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: President's Corporate Fraud Task Force Marks Five Years of Ensuring Corporate
Integrity (July 17, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/July/07_odag-507.html. The number
of whistleblower actions also has increased dramatically. See Theodore L. Banks, Tom Giller & Scott R. Lasser,
20081
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corporate "cooperation" strategies to conscript business entities into working
with the government against the interests of employees.2 The most far-reaching
of these policies are set forth in the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Holder,
Thompson and McNulty Memoranda 3 and in the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion's (SEC) Seaboard Report.4 Corporations are often quick to acquiesce in
government demands for cooperation based on these policies.5 As the Arthur
Recent Trends in Internal Investigations, 25 No. 3 ACC Docket 24 (2007) (discussing increase in size and
number of qui tam lawsuits) (citing United States Dep't of Justice News Release (Nov. 7, 2005)).
2. See, e.g., John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89
CORNELL L. REv. 310, 313 (2004) (noting that "the Justice Department has increasingly been forcing
corporations to self-police through the threat of federal prosecution"); see also, e.g., N. Richard Janis,
Deputizing Company Counsel as Agents of the.Federal Government: How Our Adversary System of Justice Is
Being Destroyed, WASH. LAW., Mar. 2005, at 32 [hereinafter Deputizing Company Counsel]; Lawrence D.
Finder & Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of Justices Corporate Charging
Policies, 15 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1 (2006); Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate
Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 311 (2007); David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of a
Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 147
(2000); see, e.g., American College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REv. 307 (2003).
3. Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder authored the first of these documents in 1999. Memorandum from
Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, on Bringing Criminal Charges Against Corporations (June 16,
1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/l999jun 16_privwaivdojholder.pdf
[hereinafter Holder Memorandum]. In 2003 Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson circulated the second
document. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson to. Heads of Department
Components, United States Attorneys on Principles of Federal Prosecution of business Organizations (Jan. 20,
2003), available at http:l/www.usdoj.gov/daglcftf/corporate-guidelines.htm [hereinafter Thompson Memoran-
dum]. A memorandum authored by Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty replaced the Thompson
Memorandum on December 12, 2006. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, U.S.
Dep't of Just., to Heads of Dep't Components, U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
dag/speechesI2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum]. Other federal agencies have also
promulgated enforcement guidance documents incorporating similar corporate cooperation measures. See
generally Baker, supra note 1 at 314-21, 326-27 (discussing various agency cooperation and compliance
guidance and observing that "[u]nder the Bush Administration, federal agencies now view codes of conduct,
compliance programs, and self-reporting as legal duties").
4. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Securities and
Exchange Commission, available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm (2001) [last
visited Mar. 18, 2008] [hereinafter Seaboard Report]; see also McAfee and Applix Statement, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties
(Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://www.sec.govlnewslpressl2006-4.htm (addressing cooperation factors in the
context of civil sanctions).
5. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REv. 1613, 1664 (2007)
("Firms assert that because an indictment sounds a death knell for a business enterprise, they have no choice but
to concede liability and settle."); Baker, supra note 2, at 337; Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 35'
(discussing "administrative death penalties"); see also Testimony of Edwin Meese before the Senate Judiciary
Committee (Sept. 12, 2006) at 3 [hereinafter Meese Testimony], available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
testimony.cfm?id=2054/& witid= 5741 ("The indictment and swift demise of the Arthur Andersen Account-
ing firm has taught every business organization a stem lesson: Failure to meet federal prosecutors' expectations
for your cooperation in the government's criminal investigation of your employees could result in a death
sentence, well before a jury is ever impaneled or opening statements are delivered at trial."); Claudius 0.
Sokenu, The Current Enforcement Environment and the Corporate Response, 1617 PLI/CoRP 368 (Aug. 16-17,
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Andersen experience illustrates, resistance is not always futile, but it may be
fatal.
Corporate "cooperation" can encompass waiver of corporate attorney-client
privilege and work product protections, denial of legal fee advances to
employees, refusal to share information or enter into joint defense agreements
with individual constituents, and even termination of employees in the absence of
any judicial or administrative finding of wrongdoing.6 Prosecutors justify
corporate cooperation demands as a means of leveraging government resources
to hold powerful organizations and their managers accountable.7 Granted, this is
no easy task in a world where global corporations have the ability to retain legal
teams capable of daunting, if not overwhelming, even the vast resources of DOJ.
However, pressure on corporations to cooperate with the government can
eviscerate attorney-client privilege protections,8 undermine internal compliance
measures,9 and alienate even the most law-abiding employees from their
employers.'° Most importantly, when prosecutors coerce corporations to cooper-
ate, individual rights are at risk."t
2007) (stating that cooperation is a necessity in the current enforcement environment and that "a 'carrot and
stick' approach to the role of cooperation is pervasive").
6. See"Holder Memorandum, supra note 3, at 3-4; Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, at *4, *7-*8; see
also Sarah Helene Duggin, The Impact of the War Over the Attorney-Client Privilege on the Business of
American Health Care, 2 J. OF CoNTEmp. HEALTH L. AND POL'Y 301 (2006) [hereinafter Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege]; Mark Robeck, Amy Vazquez, & Michael E. Clark, Corporate Cooperation in the
Face of Government Investigations, 17 No. 2 HEALTH LAW. 20, 20-21 (2005). The McNulty Memorandum
limits to some degree both the latitude of prosecutors to request corporate cooperation and the extent to which
various factors are to be considered in assessing corporate cooperation, see McNulty Memorandum, supra note
3, at 8-12. Even so, it continues to afford the government considerable discretion to take into account an entity's
willingness to engage in the kinds of cooperation that engendered the current controversy. See Letter of Karen J.
Mathis to Hon. Christopher Cox (Feb. 5, 2007), at 2 n.4 (on file with author) (DOJ's cooperation policies
"encourage prosecutors to require companies to waive attorney-client privilege and work product protections in
many cases-such as not sharing information with them, terminating them, or in certain 'rare' cases, not paying
their attorneys fees in return for such credit"); see also infra Part lf.B.
7. See infra Part II.B.2.
8. See, e.g., Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 35-36; Employee Interview, supra note 1, at
902-07; Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 2, at 147-48.
9. See, e.g., The McNulty Memorandum's Effects on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations:
Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) (statement of Karen J. Mathis),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Mathis070308.pdf [hereinafter Mathis March 2007 Testi-
mony] (discussing impact of McNulty Memorandum on corporate compliance function).
10. See, e.g., Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 907-17; Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at
34, 36; Zomow & Krakaur, supra note 2, at 160-61; cf McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3, at Executive
Summary 3 (acknowledging that "full and frank communication between corporate counsel and [entity]
employees.. .can contribute to enhanced compliance with the law").
11. See, e.g., Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association (Aug. 7-8,
2006) [hereinafter ABA Attorney-Client Privilege Resolution] (opposing federal corporate cooperation policies,
practices and procedures that erode employees' constitutional and other legal rights), available at http://
www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/; ABA Presidential Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
Recommendation 302B (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/am06302b.pdf; Em-
ployee Interview, supra note 1, at 907-16; Colin Marks, Thompson/McNulty Memo Internal Investigations:
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Corporate cooperation compromises individual rights in a variety of ways.
Employees interviewed in the course of internal investigations may unknowingly
waive their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 12 Some-such
as the KPMG partners involved in the tax shelter prosecutions at issue in United
State v. Stein' 3-may find their employers suddenly abandoning longstanding
practices of advancing counsel fees, thereby making it virtually impossible to
obtain the extensive legal assistance necessary to mount a successful defense in
complex cases.14 Others may lose their jobs as employers cut ties with
individuals who become liabilities in the effort to placate prosecutors.
15
Lawyers, too-particularly in-house counsel and corporate defense attorneys-
lose something in the process. In the current enforcement environment, ethical
obligations to client organizations force corporate lawyers to accept the role of
federal deputies in posses formed to appease prosecutors. 16 Their basic role as
Ethical Concerns of the "Deputized" Counsel, 38 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1065, 1065-66 (2007); Lawton P. Cunmings,
The Ethical Minefield: Corporate Internal Investigations and Individual Assertions of the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 109 W. VA. L. RE. 669 (2007) (discussing utilitarian and rights based approaches to attorney-client
privilege in internal investigations); Inna Dexter, Note, Regulating the Regulators: The Need for More
Guidelines on Prosecutorial Conduct in Corporate Investigations, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 515, 526 (2007)
("Increased focus on cooperation and individual accountability creates the potential for coercion and violation
of individual rights, as the resources of the companies and the prosecutors greatly outweigh the resources
available to individual employees.").
As Andrew Weissmann, former Director of the Government's Enron Task Force, has noted, it is not only
"culpable" employees who are at risk: "[a]ny person who is employed by a public or private company, a
partnership, or a non-profit could get caught up in an investigation into possible infractions as serious as
embezzlement and market manipulation or as murky as alleged violations of arcane tax... rules." Examining
Approaches to Corporate Fraud Prosecutions and the Attorney-Client Privilege Under the McNulty
Memorandum: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, l10th Cong. (2007) (statement of Andrew
Weissmann), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id = 2886&witjid = 6655 [hereinafter Weiss-
mann Testimony]:
12. See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 2, at 147, 151-52; Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 907-09.
Internal investigations are increasingly important in resolving government investigations. See Nancy
Kestenbaum & Jason P. Criss, Credit Where Credit Is Due? The Role of Internal Investigations in the Outcome
of Government Investigations, PLI Order No. 10,630 (Aug. 2006).
13. See United States v. Stein (Stein 11), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Stein (Stein 1),
435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
14. See Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 36.
15. See George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 Am. CRIm. L. REV. 985 (2005);
Griffin, supra note 2, at 355.
16. As Richard Janis observes:
To employees of a company.., the company's lawyers appear to be acting duplicitously. They are not
trying to protect the employees, but only the company; they are extracting waivers of constitutional
rights as conditions of employment and/or as a condition of payment of legal fees; and they are
prejudicing the employees' ability to defend themselves and to protect their families. Under these
circumstances, the sense of abandonment felt by the employees of organizations is palpable and, for
attorneys who have witnessed it firsthand, deeply disturbing.
Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 36; see also Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations:
Consequences of the Federal Deputation of Corporate America, 45 S. TEx. L. REv. 111 (2003); Robert A. Del
Giorno, Corporate Counsel as Government's Agent: The Holder Memorandum and Sarbanes-Oxley Section
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defense attorneys is co-opted, and they become de facto government agents.
17
Moreover, while all lawyers have an ethical obligation to be fair to non-clients,
pressure to produce results can influence investigating counsel already struggling
to strike the right balance between vigorously pursuing internal investigations
and unfairly infringing on individual rights.1
8
For many lawyers, there is a deep-seated sense that something is wrong
here-a perception that in our zeal to ferret out and punish those who abuse
corporate power we have overextended corporate criminal liability and initiated a
pattern of manipulating organizations into undermining the basic civil liberties of
their employees.' 9 The depth of concern about these issues is evident in the
intensive efforts of the ABA and a diverse group of business, law and civil rights
advocacy groups 20 to persuade DOJ, SEC and other federal agencies to abandon
corporate cooperation strategies and in the ongoing campaign to engage
Congress in the battle.2t In June 2006, in United States v. Stein (Stein /),22 United
States District Judge Lewis Kaplan joined in criticizing the policies embodied in
307, 27 AuG. CHAMP 22 (Aug. 2003); Andrew Longstreth, Double Agent: In the New Era of Internal
Investigations, Defense Lawyers Have Become Deputy Prosecutors, 27 AM. LAW. No. 2 (Feb. 2005); Marks,
supra note 11, at 1066; Zomow & Krakaur, supra note 2, at 157.
17. See, e.g., Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 912,Zomow & Krakaur, supra note 2, at 157. Attorneys
whose conduct the government deems unacceptable have also been the subject of criminal and civil
enforcement proceedings. See SEC Cases Involving Practicing Attorneys in Risk Issues and Internal
Investigations: Best Practices and Ethical Considerations in Committee on White Collar Crime, ABA Section
of Business Law Spring Meeting (March 15-18, 2007) (discussing civil enforcement proceedings and one
criminal prosecution of attorneys representing public companies); Lewis D. Lowenfels, Alan R. Bromberg &
Michael J. Sullivan, Attorneys as Gatekeepers in the Age of Sarbanes-Oxley, 37 U. TOL. L. REv. 877, 929-30
(2006) (discussing dramatic increase in number of SEC actions against lawyers since passage of Sarbanes-
Oxley). For analysis of information available regarding actions against in-house counsel, see JoHNt K. VI.A,
SEC AND CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST INSIDE CORPORATE CouNsEL (2005), available at http://www.acca.conf/
resource/v6063.
18. See, e.g., Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 36; GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM
HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 17.13 (2007).
19. See, e.g., William R. McLucas, Howard M. Shapiro & Julie J. Song, The Decline of the Attorney-Client
Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621,622 (2006) (suggesting that the process
engendered by federal corporate cooperation policies in recent years "has, at a minimum, eroded our traditional
adversarial process and skewed the balance of power between government investigators and their corporate
targets"); see also Dexter, supra note 11, at 516 (noting that "much of the criticism [of the Thompson
Memorandum] has focused on the imbalance of power ... between prosecutors and corporations"); Earl J.
Silbert & Demme Doufekias Joannou, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of Corporate Privilege
Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1225, 1229 (2006). But see Christopher A. Wray &
Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and
Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1095, 1096-97 (2006) (noting that while "a healthy measure of caution in the
[Thompson] Memo's application is well warranted," "the Memo has largely accomplished its objectives and...
many of the criticisms are overwrought"); cf Baker, supra note 2, at 312-13 (noting that through delegation
"Congress has allowed executive and independent agencies to implement policies that Congress might never
approve if it actually voted on them").
20. See infra note 58 & accompanying text.
21. See infra Part I.A & C.
22. United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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the Thompson Memorandum. Judge Kaplan's initial opinion on the matter
excoriated the government for coercing KPMG to interfere with the Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights of its employees.23 In a subsequent decision handed
down in July 2007 (Stein II) he dismissed indictments against thirteen of the
sixteen individual KPMG defendants.24
The June 2006 Stein decision, in combination with widespread criticism of
corporate cooperation policies and a desire to stave off Congressional interven-
tion, led DOJ to amend the most aggressive of its dictates in December 2006,25
but the basic framework remains intact. There is little reason to expect significant
changes any time soon. The Holder Memorandum originated during the Clinton
Administration, and the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda, as well as the
Seaboard Report, are products of the Bush Administration. Consequently, even
though a new President will take office in 2009, it is not at all clear that either
party would materially alter present corporate cooperation policies. 26 In Novem-
ber 2007 the House of Representatives passed legislation designed to constrain
implementation of federal corporate cooperation measures, but it is uncertain
whether the political will exists to support passage of the Senate counterpart of
the House bill.27 Even if the Senate acts, however, the government will continue
to exert powerful influence over entities confronted with criminal investigations,
influence that adversely impacts the Constitutional rights of employees.
The purpose of this article is to suggest that the legal profession must look
inward-to the ethical standards that govern the practice of law-as well as
outward in seeking solutions; As lawyers we are caught up in the crosscurrents of
political and societal reactions to recent corporate financial debacles and the
resulting loss of trust in corporations and corporate managers. Even so, whether
we represent the government, a corporation, or an individual, lawyers have a say
in how our services will be used. The corporate cooperation controversy lies
uniquely within the province of the legal profession. Lawyers created the policies
at issue; lawyers continue to implement the challenged strategies; and lawyers
advise client entities to submit to privilege waiver and other corporate coopera-
tion demands. In any given matter, the conduct of a particular lawyer is
23. Id. at 381-82.
24. United States v. Stein (Stein I1), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 393-94, 427 (S.D.N.Y 2007).
25. See, e.g., N. Richard Janis, The McNulty Memorandum: Much Ado About Nothing WASH. LAW., Feb.
2007, at text accompanying n. 6 [hereinafter Much Ado About Nothing], available at http://www.dcbar.org/
forlawyers/resources/publications/Washingtonjlawyer/february_2007/stand.cfm; John A. Tancabel, Reflections
on the McNulty Memorandum, 35 No. 3 SEc. REG. L.J. at text accompanying n.7 (Fall 2007); Weissmann
Testimony, supra note 11, at 1, 5.
26. See, e.g., McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3, at preface; Testimony of ABA President Karen Mathis
before the House Judiciary Committee (March 2007) (reporting DOJ's "reluctant decision" to modify the
Thompson Memorandum by replacing it with the McNulty Memorandum).
27. The U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 3013 on November 13, 2007. Counterpart legislation has
been pending in the U.S. Senate since December 2006. The current bill is S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3 (2007). These
bills are discussed infra Part .D.
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constricted by the ethical obligation to act in the best interest of the client, but as a
profession we have the ability to determine what our ethical standards will be.
The ethics of corporate cooperation merit careful consideration, precisely
because the line between zealous representation of an entity client and unfairness
to its constituents is so hard to locate.28 Nevertheless, getting the boundaries right
is critical to both the civil liberties of individuals entangled in corporate
investigations and the integrity of the profession itself.
Part I of this article provides an overview of federal corporate cooperation
policies, the principal arguments of their proponents and opponents, and
proposals for legislative intervention. Part II discusses recent rulings in the
KPMG prosecution and their potential impact, and Part m reviews the
implications of the ongoing debate over the scope of corporate criminal liability.
Part IV explores the concomitant responsibility of the legal profession to
reexamine the rules of ethics that govern the practice of law for both prosecutors
and corporate defense counsel in the corporate cooperation arena. The article
concludes by offering some concrete suggestions for change and ideas for future
consideration.
I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF FEDERAL CORPORATE COOPERATION POLICIES
AND ONGOING EFFORTS TO EFFECT ADMINISTRATIVE, LEGISLATIVE, AND
DOCTRINAL CHANGE
A. THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL CORPORATE COOPERATION
POLICIES
There is a tendency to link the genesis of federal corporate cooperation
strategies to the collapse of Enron and the great awakening to managerial
28. One of the earliest law review discussions of the ethical problems of internal investigations, Kathryn W.
Tate, Lawyer Ethics and the Corporate Employee: Is the Employee Owed More Protection Than the Model
Rules Provide?, 23 IND. L. REv. 1 (1990), was published more than seventeen years ago. David Zornow and
Keith Krakaur published a seminal article on the death of corporate privilege and its implications in 2000.
Zornow & Karkaur, supra note 2. As early as 2000, the American Corporate Counsel Association (now the
Association of Corporate Counsel) wrote to DOJ to raise concerns about prosecutors' requests for waiver of
attorney-client privilege and work product protections. See Letter from Am. Corp. Counsel Ass'n to the Hon.
Eric Holder. (May 12, 2000), http://www.acc.com/public/accapolicy/holder.htm [hereinafter ACC Letter]
(cited in Baker, supra note 1, at 329). Other early articles discussing demands for waiver of corporate
attorney-client privilege and work product protections include Judson W. Starr & Brian L. Flack, The
Government's Insistence on a Waiver of Privilege, 2001 ABA NAT'L INST. ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME J-1 (cited in
Am. College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 4, at 330 & n.99) (noting call of U.S. Attorney for Southern District of
New York "for a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege by all corporate targets wising to obtain credit
for their cooperation"), and Jonathan D. Polkes & Renee L. Jarusinsky, Waiver of Corporate Privileges in a
government Investigation: Reaction to the New DOJ Policy, 2001 ABA WHTrrE COLLAR CRIME COMM. ANNUAL
MEETING J-31-J-33 (cited in Am. College of Tr. Lawyers, supra note 2, at 308 n.2). I first wrote about these
issues in an article published in 2003. Employee Interview supra note 1. Other articles that have raised ethical
concerns in this area include, for example, Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2; Griffin, supra note 2;
Dexter, supra note 11, at 529; Marks, supra note 11.
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infidelity that followed. The origins of the current debate, however, date back to
the United States Sentencing Commission's (USSC) promulgation of the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 199129 and the rapid increase in
corporate prosecutions that began in earnest in the 1990S.30 Prior to the late
1960s, prosecution of corporations and other entities was relatively unusual.3 1 In
the 1970s, however, the Watergate scandal, revelations about payment of bribes
to foreign government officials, and the disclosure of illegal campaign contribu-
tions to American politicians 32 significantly undermined public trust in major
corporations. As law enforcement authorities began to scrutinize businesses, it
soon became apparent that some corporations were making illicit payments in the
ordinary course of doing business. 33 Corporations too often benefited from such
payments, as well as from other illegal actions on the part of individual
constituents.3 4 Consequently, prosecutorial attention increasingly focused on
business entities,35 and the number of federal prosecutions of corporations
climbed steadily throughout the 1990s.
36
In pursuing corporate offenders, federal prosecutors began to consider a
variety of factors in determining whether to charge the entities themselves.
"Cooperation" soon became a critical component of the charging calculus, and
prosecutors began to measure cooperation in terms of a company's willingness to
waive attorney-client privilege and work product protections and to refrain from
sharing information or entering into joint defense agreements with individuals
likely to be charged with criminal violations. Prosecutors also began to suggest
that failing to sanction, continuing to employ, or advancing attorneys' fees to
employees identified as "culpable" evidenced a lack of cooperation on the part of
29. The United States Sentencing Commission promulgated its Organizational Sentencing Guidelines on
November 1, 1991 to facilitate "just punishment, adequate deterrence, and incentives for organizations to
maintain internal mechanisms for preventing, detecting, and reporting criminal conduct." U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANuAL, ch. 8, introductory cmt (2002). For a more detailed discussion of the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines and their impact, see Baker, supra note 2, at 313-25; Buell, supra note 5, at 1662;
Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 874-81. In its 2005 decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), the United States Supreme Court held that mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines violated
an individual's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and concluded that federal courts should view the Guidelines
as advisory rather than mandatory in nature. The Sentencing Guidelines, however, continue to influence
sentencing in the federal courts. See U.S. SENTENCING Comm., REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER, available at http://www.ussc.gov/booker-report/BookerReport.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
30. See BaicKEY, supra note 1, at § 1:01.
31. See Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 868-80.
32. See S'rTEPHN F. BLACK, INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS §1.01, at 1-1 (1998); BRIcKEY, supra note 1, at § 1.01;
Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 872.
33. See BRIcKEY, supra note 1, at § 1.01.
34. For example, overcharges to the Medicare program and billing for services not performed added
significantly to the bottom line for several health care entities. See, e.g., In re Caremark Derivative Litigation,
698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
35. See generally, V. S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1477, 1477-78, 1488-91 (1996); BRICKLEY, supra, note 1.
36. See BRICKEY, supra note 1, at § 1:01.
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an entity under investigation.37 By the end of the decade, in the wake of
Caremark, Columbia/HCA and other major corporate prosecutions, Deputy
Attorney General Eric Holder circulated Principles of Prosecution of Corpora-
tions to provide guidance to DOJ attorneys throughout the country.3 9 In 2001, the
year of Enron's collapse, the SEC released the Seaboard Report announcing that
the Commission would consider many of the same kinds of corporate coopera-
tion factors outlined in the Holder Memorandum in the context of SEC
enforcement proceedings. 4° By this time in-house counsel and members of the
defense bar were raising serious questions about the government's approach to
37. On the basis of my own experience as a criminal defense attorney and general counsel, I encountered
waiver requests and admonitions concerning employee legal fees advances and imposition of sanctions at least
five years before DOJ issued the Holder Memorandum in 1999. See also Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective
Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587,597
(2004) (noting that criticisms of DOJ waiver requests date back at least to 1995) (citing Jed Rakoff, Coerced
Waiver of Corporate Privilege, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1995, at 1).
38. See In re Caremark Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996); Employee Interview, supra note
1, at 881-83 (including sources cited therein).
39. Holder Memorandum, supra note 3, at *3-*4. The eight factors set forth in the Holder Memorandum are
as follows:
1. The nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public, and applicable
policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations for particular categories of
crime...
2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the complicity in, or
condonation of, wrongdoing by corporate management...
3. The corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory
enforcement actions against it....
4. The corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate
in the investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client
and work product privileges...
5. The existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program...
6. The corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an effective corporate
compliance program or to improve an existing one, to replace responsible management, to
discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant
government agencies...
7. Collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to shareholders and employees not
proven personally culpable...
8. The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions ....
Id.
40. See Seaboard Report, supra note 4, at 1-3. In the Seaboard Report the SEC resolved a cease-and-desist
proceeding against a former controller of Seaboard Corporation. The SEC found that Meredith had caused
inaccuracies in Seaboard's accounting records and then covered up the fact. Id. The SEC, however, announced
that it had decided not to take action against the company because of its prompt efforts to address the problem
once it was discovered. Id. The SEC listed thirteen factors that, while not binding, would-ordinarily be taken into
account in determining whether to credit a corporation's cooperation. These factors include many of those
identified in the Holder and Tiompson Memoranda, such as the nature, seriousness, and pervasiveness of the
problem. Portions of these criteria are particularly noteworthy in terms of this discussion:
8. What steps did the company take upon learning of the misconduct? Did the company
immediately stop the misconduct? Are the persons responsible for any misconduct still with the
company? If so, are they still in the same positions? Did the company promptly, completely and
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corporate cooperation, 4 ' but the uproar over Enron's collapse and the string of
financial debacles that followed drowned out these warnings.
In the midst of the corporate scandals that rocked the country so soon after the
human tragedy of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush appointed a
special Corporate Fraud Task Force,42 and in 2002 Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation.43 Within a six-month period DOJ opened more than
150 investigations, filed criminal charges against more than 200 individuals, and
delivered more than 60 guilty pleas in federal criminal proceedings against
business entities.44 In 2003, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson replaced
the Holder Memorandum with a document establishing new Principles of
effectively disclose the existence of the misconduct to the public, to regulators and to self-regulators?
Did the company cooperate completely with appropriate regulatory and law enforcement bodies?...
9. What processes did the company follow to resolve many of these issues and ferret out necessary
information?...
10. Did the company commit to learn the truth, fully and expeditiously? Did it do a thorough review
of the nature, extent, origins and consequences of the conduct and related behavior?...
11. Did the company promptly make available to [SEC] staff the results of its review and provide
sufficient documentation reflecting its response to the situation? Did the company identify possible
violative conduct and evidence with sufficient precision to facilitate prompt enforcement actions
against those who violated the law? Did the company produce a thorough and probing written report
detailing the findings of its review? Did the company voluntarily disclose information { SEC] staff did
not directly request and otherwise might not have uncovered? Did the company ask its employees to
cooperate with [SEC] staff and make all reasonable efforts to secure such cooperation?
Id. For discussion of the Seaboard Report in comparison with DOJ guidance such as the Thompson
Memorandum, see Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1108-12.
In the wake of Enron, the SEC and other enforcement agencies also expanded enforcement resources. See,
e.g., id. at 1108-33 (discussing pre and post-Thompson Memorandum corporate cooperation policies of SEC,
Federal Financial Institutions Regulatory Agencies, Department of Defense, Environmental Protection Agency,
Department of Health and Human Services, Federal Aviation Administration, Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, Commodity Futures trading Commission, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and
Security, and the Department of Labor Employee Benefits Security Administration). A number of self-
regulatory organizations such as the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, also have instituted cooperation policies in assessing the seriousness of violations and responses. See
id. at 1125 & n. 150; see also Banks, Giller & Lassar, supra note 1, at 27-28 (noting 45% increase in SEC budget
in 2003, addition of more than 1000 staff members between 2002 and 2005, highlighting the impact of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board created by Sarbanes-Oxley, and observing that "directors are
increasingly demanding that management investigate possible misconduct" because of concerns over personal
and entity liability).
41. See, e.g.,ACC Letter, supra note 28; Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 2.
42. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf-
execorder.htm; see Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1097 (noting that "[tihe spate of corporate scandals that began
with Enron's meltdown in 2001 prompted the Bush Administration to dramatically increase the federal
government's focus on rooting out corporate fraud and restoring confidence in the integrity of our markets").
43. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002) (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
44. Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks at United States Department of Justice Press Conference (Feb.
25, 2003) (announcing civil charges against former Qwest officials), available at http:/www.usdoj.gov/archive/
ag/speeches/2003/022503qwestpressconference.htm.
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Prosecution of Business Organizations.45 The declared objective of the Thomp-
son Memorandum was an "increased focus on and scrutiny of a corporation's
cooperation" with federal investigators. 6 Mr. Thompson noted that "[t]he
revisions also address[ed] the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms in
place within a corporation. ' '4 7 Specifically, the new policy pronouncement made
consideration of the factors it identified mandatory for prosecutors considering
charging business entities.48 The Thompson Memorandum kept much of the
Holder Memorandum principles intact, including the waiver language and
negative references to advancement of attorneys fees and other support for
"culpable" employees.49 It also admonished prosecutors to ensure that corporate
compliance measures were not just "paper programs, 50 and added consideration
of "the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corpora-
tion's malfeasance" as a separate factor in corporate prosecution decisions.51
The Thompson Memorandum ignited an already smoldering debate, and the
ABA, members of the business community, and civil rights advocates joined the
Association of Corporate Counsel and the defense bar in challenging federal
corporate cooperation policies. In 2004, ABA President Robert Grey appointed a
special Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege,52 and a diverse group of
business, law and civil rights advocacy groups united to form the Coalition to
Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege.5 3 The ABA and the Coalition, joined by a
group of former senior DOJ officials, 54 initiated an intensive campaign to
45. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3.
46. Id. at *1 (preface).
47. Id.
48. Id. at *2.
49. Compare id. at *7-*8, with Holder Memorandum, supra note 3, at 7.
50. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, at *10.
51. Id. at *3-*4 (adding ninth factor to the eight Holder criteria).
52. See Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, A.B.A. President Robert Grey Creates Task Force to Advocate for
Attorney-Client Privilege, Oct. 6, 2004, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/
pressrelease.pdf; Report of the A.B.A. Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, available at http://
www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/report.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).
53. White Collar Enforcement: Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Waivers: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Thomas J, Donohue, Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege) available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/OversightTestimony.aspx?ID=568 [hereinafter Coalition March 2006 Testimony].
The Coalition is comprised of the American Chemistry Council, American Civil Liberties Union, Association of
Corporate Counsel, Business Civil Liberties, Inc., Business Round Table, Frontiers of Freedom, National
Association of Manufacturers, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Washington Legal Foundation. Id. at I.
54. Former DOJ officials actively engaged in opposing DOJ's corporate cooperation policies include three
former Attorneys General, a former Acting Attorney General, three former Solicitors General, a former Acting
Solicitor General, two former Deputy Attorneys General and a partridge in a pear tree. See, e.g., Letter to Hon.
Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General, from Griffin B. Bell, Attorney General (1977-1979), Carol E. Dinkins,
Deputy Attorney General (1984-1985), Walter E. Dellinger, Acting Solicitor General (1996-1997), Stuart M.
Gerson, Acting Attorney General (1993) and Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division (1989-1993), Jamie
Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General (1994-1997), Edwin Meese mH,Attorney General (1985-1988), Theodore B.
Olson, Solicitor General (2001-2004), Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General (1988-1991), George J.
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persuade DOJ to pull back from the Thompson Memorandum55 and to urge the
SEC to modify the principles set forth in the Seaboard Report.56 In November
2004, however, the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC) voted to
include a reference to voluntary waiver of attorney-client privilege and work
product protections in advisory note 8C2.5 to the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines.57
The USSC's decision provided a focal point for opponents of corporate
cooperation policies. During 2005 both the ABA and the Coalition ramped up
efforts to undo the USSC's action, persuade DOJ to modify the Thompson
Memorandum, and engage members of Congress in the campaign. In August
2005, in response to a report and recommendations from the Attorney-Client
Privilege Task Force, the ABA House of Delegates passed a resolution decrying
the assault on the attorney-client privilege.58 In November 2005, opponents
turned out in force to testify before the USSC in hearings on advisory note
8C2.5.5 9 The efforts bore fruit in April 2006 when the USSC voted to delete the
waiver language.6 °
Terwilliger IH, Deputy Attorney General (1991-1992), Kenneth W. Starr, Solicitor General (1989-1993), and
Seth P. Waxman, Solicitor General (1997-2001) (on file with author) (stating that "the Thompson Memorandum
is seriously flawed and undermines, rather than enhances, compliance with the law and the many other societal
benefits that arise from the confidential attorney-client relationship.. .waiver of attorney-client privilege and
work-product protections should not be a factor in determining whether an organization has cooperated with the
government in an investigation").
55. See, e.g., Letter of Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Assn, to Hon. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney Gen.
(May 2, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/stateandlocalbar/
2006050200000.pdf (objecting to impact of Thompson Memorandum and proposing specific changes in its
language).
56. See, e.g., Letter of Karen Mathis to Hon. Christopher Cox, supra note 6. A number of legal journals and a
handful of major newspapers also published editorials in support of the ABA and Coalition efforts.
57. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2004).
58. Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 2005),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/recommendation -adopted.pdf.
59. See, e.g., Testimony of Stanton D. Anderson, Senior Counsel, U.S Chamber of Commerce on behalf of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce before the United States
Sentencing Commission 1 (Nov. 15, 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/l 15-05/Anderson.pdf;
Testimony of Henry W. Asbill on behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers before the
United States Sentencing Commission (Nov. 15, 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/1l-15-05/
Asbill.pdf; Testimony of Donald C. Klawiter, Chair, Antitrust, A.B.A., before the United States Sentencing
Commission 1 (Nov. 15, 2005); Statement of Richard Thornburgh, Counsel, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson
Graham LLP and Former Attorney General of the United States before the U.S. Sentencing Commission Public
Meeting Regarding Chapter Eight Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege & Work Product Protections (Nov. 15,
2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/ll 15_05/Thornburgh.pdf; Testimony of Tina S. Van Dam,
Senior Counsel, National Ass'n of Manufacturers, on behalf of the American Chemistry Council, the Corporate
Counsel Ass'n and the National Ass'n of Manufacturers, before the United States Sentencing Commission
(Nov. 15, 2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/corp/I1 15 05VanDam-ACC-NAM.pdf.
60. The USSC voted to delete the challenged language pertaining to waiver of the attorney-client privilege
on April 5, 2006. 71 Fed. Reg. 28,063 (May 15, 2006). Several months prior to the USSC's decision the ABA
House of Delegates adopted a resolution urging the USSC to amend Application Note § 8C2.5 in several
specific ways. Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, supra note 58.
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Meanwhile those who opposed federal corporate cooperation policies were
also making headway on Capitol Hill. In March 2006, the House Judiciary's
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security held the first
Congressional hearings on DOJ's policies.6 ' Several weeks later, in May 2006,
the ABA sent a letter to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales urging specific
revisions to the Thompson Memorandum including deletion of language
referring to waiver of corporate attorney-client privilege and work product
protections, 62 advancement of legal fees, and sanctioning of culpable employ-
ees. 63 In place of these references, the ABA suggested language pertaining to a
corporation's "timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing," and its willing-
ness to "cooperate in the investigation of its agents," "identify the culprits within
the corporation, including senior executives"; "make witnesses available"; and
"disclose the results of its internal investigation.
' 64
It was also in 2006 that a serious challenge to DOJ's corporate cooperation
policies arose in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. There the United States Attorney prosecuted nineteen individuals, includ-
ing seventeen former KPMG partners and employees, in connection with a
massive tax fraud estimated to have cost the government more than $2 billion.65
As discussed in more detail below, 66 Judge Lewis Kaplan held that the
government had unconstitutionally interfered with the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights of individual KPMG defendants as a result of the conduct of
prosecutors in tandem with the impact of the Thompson Memorandum.67 A
month later, on the basis of his conclusions that the government's conduct was
unconstitutional, Judge Kaplan granted the motions of two defendants to
68suppress statements proffered to prosecutors in the course of the investigation.
Judge Kaplan's rulings further galvanized opposition to federal corporate
For a more detailed discussion of the efforts of the ABA and Coalition, as well as the government's responses
through the summer of 2006, see Sarah Helene Duggin, The Impact of the War Over the Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege on the Business of American Health Care, 22 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 301
(2006).
61. White Collar Enforcement: Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Waivers: Hearing Before .the
Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Oversight.aspx?ID=222.
62. Letter of Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Hon. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney Gen. supra
note 55 (enclosing Suggested Revisions to Department of Justice Policy Concerning Waiver of Corporate
Attorney-Client and Work Product Protections Prepared by the American Bar Association Task Force on
Attorney-Client privilege [hereinafter ABA Suggested DOJ Policy Revisions]); see infra Part lI.C.2.
63. ABA Suggested DOJ Policy Revisions, supra note 62, at 1-2.
64. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
65. Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753, 756 (2d Cir. 2007). One of the seventeen KPMG defendants pled
guilty, but the rest contested the charges. United States v. Stein (Stein I1), 495 F Supp. 2d 390, 394 & n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
66. See infra Part II.D.
67. United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see infra Part HI.D.
68. United States v. Stein, 440 F Supp. 2d 315, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see infra Part IIA.
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cooperation policies. On August 5, 2006, the ABA's House of Delegates passed a
resolution opposing "government policies, practices and procedures that have the
effect of eroding the constitutional and other legal rights of current or former
employees, officers, directors and agents., 69 The ABA specifically objected to
consideration of advancement of counsel fees, joint defense agreements, sharing
of records, and a company's refusal to sanction employees who choose to
exercise Fifth Amendment rights7° as indicative of a company's failure to
cooperate fully with the government. As the controversy intensified, the Senate,
too, entered the fray. On September 12, 2006, the Senate Judiciary Committee
convened hearings on the Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to
Counsel in Corporate Investigations.7t
In response to these developments, DOJ again amended its Principles of
Prosecution of Business Organizations. In October 2006, Acting Deputy
Attorney General Robert McCallum instructed United States Attorneys' Offices
to establish written guidelines governing requests for waiver of corporate
attorney-client and work product protections.72 The McCallum Memorandum,
however, did not require United States Attorneys to make their waiver policies
public.73 On December 12, 2006, DOJ took a more significant step when Deputy
Attorney General Paul McNulty issued a new set of policy guidelines that
modified the Thompson Memorandum in a few important respects.74 In his cover
memorandum Mr. McNulty declared: "With this new guidance, the Department
will continue its aggressive efforts to route [sic] out corruption in our financial
markets and to protect the American investor, while allowing corporations to
secure appropriate legal counsel."75 The McNulty Memorandum is DOJ's most
recent comprehensive pronouncement on corporate cooperation.7 6
B. THE McNULTY MEMORANDUM
According to DOJ, the McNulty Memorandum "clarifie[d] prior guidance and
establishe[d] new clear approval requirements for requests of sensitive, privi-
69. Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association (Aug. 7, 2006),
available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attmrneyclient/materials/hod/emprights-recommendation-adopt
ed.pdf [hereinafter ABA Employee Rights Resolution].
70. Id.
71. S. Comm.on the Judiciary, Notice of Hearing, http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=2054 (last
visited Mar. 18, 2008).
72. Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Department
Components, United States Attorneys, on Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection
(Oct. 21, 2005) [hereinafter McCallum Memorandum].
73. Id. See Meese September 2006 Testimony, supra note 5, at 4.
74. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3.
75. Id. at 1.
76. But see Banks, Giller & Lassar, supra note 1, at 28 ("The McNulty Memorandum is a major retreat under
pressure by the department. Prosecutors will be much more hesitant to demand privilege waivers.").
[Vol. 21:341
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL ETHics
leged information,"77 thereby evidencing that "[tihe Department strongly
supports the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege and work product protec-
tions."7 8 The McNulty Memorandum, however, did little to quell the outcry over
DOJ's corporate cooperation policies. 79 The following discussion provides an
overview of the McNulty Memorandum and the principal arguments raised by
DOJ in defense of the document and its predecessors.
1. PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS
The McNulty Memorandum incorporates most of the provisions of the
Thompson Memorandum, and, like the earlier document, it imposes a mandatory
obligation on federal prosecutors to consider the factors it sets forth in
determining whether and how to charge corporations and other entities. It amends
the Thompson Memorandum's provisions with respect to requests for waiver of
corporate attorney-client privilege and work product protections, as well as the
consideration to be accorded to an entity's advancement of legal fees to
employees.
a. Waiver Requests
The McNulty Memorandum instructs prosecutors to request materials pro-
tected by attorney-client privilege or work product protections only "when there
is a legitimate need for the privileged information to fulfill their law enforcement
obligations." 80 The legitimate need calculus is to be based on four factors: Benefit
to the government's investigation, availability of alternative means to obtain the
information in a timely manner, completeness of voluntary disclosure, and
collateral consequences of a waiver.81
If prosecutors determine that a legitimate need for a waiver exists, they are to
follow a multi-step approach beginning with "the least intrusive waiver necessary
to conduct a complete and thorough investigation. 82 The McNulty Memoran-
dum differentiates between waiver requests designed to elicit "facts" (Category I
information) and "legal advice or non-fact attorney work product" (Category II
information).83 Category I "fact" material includes "witness statements, or purely
factual interview memoranda regarding the misconduct, organization charts
77. United States Dep't of Justice, Executive Summary 3 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/
poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2006dec I 2_privwaivdojexecsum.pdf.
78. Id.; see McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2, 8.
79. See Much Ado About Nothing, supra note 25, at text accompanying note 6 (discussing failure of McNulty
Memorandum to make significant changes in approach of Thompson Memorandum and suggesting that the later
document may actually raise more problems in some respects).
80. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3, at 8.
81. Id. at 9.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 9-10.
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created by company counsel, factual chronologies, factual summaries or reports
(or portions thereof) containing investigative facts documented by counsel," and
other material "uncovered in a company's internal investigation of corporate
misconduct., 84 Requests for Category I information must be approved by the
requesting prosecutor's United States Attorney in consultation with the Assistant
Attorney General for the Criminal Division.85 United States Attorneys have
authority to approve "requests for (1) legal advice given contemporaneous to the
misconduct being investigated, if the company is relying upon an advice-of-
counsel defense to justify the conduct; and (2) legal advice or communications in
furtherance of a crime or fraud, coming within the crime-fraud exception to the
attorney-client privilege.",86 Prosecutors may consider a corporation's refusal to
waive attorney-client privilege or work product protections as to Category I
materials in making charging decisions.87
Prosecutors are to request Category II information only when Category I
information "provides an incomplete basis to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion."' 88 Prior to requesting Category II information, prosecutors must obtain
written approval from the Deputy Attorney General. 89 They are not to consider a
corporation's refusal to waive Category II privilege and work product protections
against the company in making charging decisions.90 Significantly, however,
prosecutors need not obtain any authorization if a corporation "voluntarily offers
privileged information without a request from the government." 91
b. Advancement of Attorneys' Fees
The second major difference between the McNulty and Thompson Memo-
randa is that the McNulty document amends the Thompson Memorandum's
instructions with respect to a company's advancement of counsel fees to
employees.92 It instructs that fee advancement may be considered only in
"extremely rare circumstances" '93 in which "the totality of the circumstances"
suggests that fee advancement is intended "to impede a criminal investigation. 94
In such instances, the McNulty Memorandum requires prosecutors to obtain
written approval from the Deputy Attorney General to consider fee advancement
84. Id. at 9.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id. at 9-10..
87. Id. at 9.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id. at 10.
91. Id. at 11.
92. Id. at 11-12.
93. Id. at 11 n.3.
94. Id.
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in deciding whether to prosecute a business organization. 9
The McNulty Memorandum, however, does not alter Deputy Attorney General
Thompson's approach with respect to other kinds of employee support. Thus, like
its predecessor, the McNulty Memorandum provides:
a corporation's promise of support to culpable employees and agents, e.g.,
through retaining the employees without sanction for their misconduct or
through providing information to the employees about the government's
investigation pursuant to a joint defense agreement may be considered by the
prosecutor in weighing the extent and value of a corporation's cooperation.
96
2. DOJ's DEFENSE OF THE HOLDER-THOMPSON-MCNULTY APPROACH
Although the Holder Memorandum preceded the Enron debacle by more than
two years, DOJ representatives invariably cite Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and
similar fiascos to justify waiver demands and other corporate cooperation
strategies. For example, in September 2006 hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Mr. McNulty testified that "[t]he guidance contained in the
Thompson Memorandum ... must be viewed in the context of [the] massive
corporate scandals" that began with the fall of Enron in 2001. Citing a July
2002 statement by Senator Leahy that "a pickpocket who steals 50 dollars
[should] not serve more time than a CEO who steals two million dollars, ' '9 8 Mr.
McNulty asserted that corporate cooperation strategies are essential tools in
holding corporate wrongdoers accountable99 and that the policies embodied in
the Thompson Memorandum provided "an effective balance between the
interests of the business community and the investing public."' °
A year later, once again in hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
95. Id. at 12. An article prodhced by the American College of Trial Lawyers makes the telling point that
DOJ's internal guidelines allow DOJ to pay counsel fees for prosecutors subject to federal criminal
investigations. See American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 2, at 335 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.15(a)(7)). In
addition, Delaware and most states allow advancement of attorneys' fees. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2001
& Supp. 2006). The Model Business Corporation Act also follows this approach. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 8.53
(2002). For a general discussion of corporate indemnification principles, see ALAN R. PALMrrER, CORPORATiONS:
EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS (2006).
96. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3, at 11; Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, at *7-*8.
97. The Thompson Memorandum's Effects on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, ll0th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Deputy Attorney General Paul J.
McNulty), available at http:lljudiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2054&witid=2742 [hereinafter Mc-
Nulty Testimony].
98. Id. at 1 (quoting remarks of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy).
99. Id. at 4.
100. Id. See also The McNulty Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Barry M. Sabin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Sabin07O308.pdf (emphasizing the prudence and necessity of the Mc-
Nulty Memorandum criteria); Hearing Before the H. Subomm. On Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related
Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of James B. Comey, Deputy
20081
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DOJ spokesperson Karin Immergut, United States Attorney for Oregon and Chair
of the Attorney General's Advisory Committee, began her prepared remarks with
a statement building on Mr. McNulty's theme:
In the aftermath of corporate scandals like Enron, Worldcom and Adelphia, the
Department has worked very hard to bring corporate criminals to justice,
protect investors, shareholders and our nation's retirees from the devastating
effects of corporate fraud, and return assets to victims of crime. Since 2002, the
Corporate Fraud Task Force-a multi-agency Task Force charged with
restoring investor confidence in America's corporations by investigating and
prosecuting those who violate the trust of employees and investors-has
utilized enhanced statutory tools provided by Congress to pursue corporate
wrongdoing through the dedicated and professional efforts of agents and
prosecutors whose effective investigation and prosecution of complex schemes
have resulted in more than 1200 corporate fraud convictions and the recovery
of billions of dollars for investors and shareholders in criminal and civil
proceedings. 101
Both Mr. McNulty and Ms. Immergut denied that DOJ's privilege waiver
requests are excessive.10 2 Ms. Immergut asserted that prosecutors seek privilege
waivers on "a limited basis" and then only to learn facts necessary to streamline
investigations.' 0 3 Mr. McNulty insisted that the determination whether to
advance legal fees to employees, "[1]ike waiver ... is the company's choice
alone.,,1 4.
Mr. McNulty also defended the Thompson Memorandum as a means of
"promote[ing] transparency in the one area [in which] a prosecutor can exercise
the most individual choice and judgment-the charging process."' 0 5 He sug-
gested that without such guidance "each individual prosecutor [would be] free to
exercise his own unguided discretion about which corporation to charge and
which not to[]." 10 6 Ms. Immergut, like Mr. McNulty, similarly emphasized the
importance of DOJ policies in "ensur[ing] consistency in corporate charging
decisions, ' 7 and promoting "greater transparency and predictability in the
Attorney General), available at www.usdoj.gov/archive/dag/testimony/2004/03232004dagstatementombbudget-
comfinal.htm.
101. Examining Approaches to Corporate Fraud Prosecutions and the Attorney-Client Privilege Under the
McNulty Memorandum: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1l0th Cong. 1-2 (2007) (statement of
Karin Immergut), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2886&wit-id=6653 [hereinafter
Immergut Testimony].
102. McNulty Testimony, supra note 97, at 4 ("we do not ask for waiver in every investigation"); Immergut
Testimony, supra note 101, at 2 ("privilege waivers [are] sought only from corporations that wish to
cooperate"). see also Buchanan, supra note 37, at 598.
103. Immergut Testimony, supra note 101, at 3.
104. McNulty Testimony, supra note 97, at 6.
105. Id. at 3.
106. Id.
107. Immergut Testimony, supra note 101, at 2. See McNulty Testimony, supra note 97, at 2.
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investigation and prosecution arena."'at 8 She described the McNulty Memoran-
dum as a memorialization of common sense prosecutorial considerations created
"in part... in response to concerns that prosecutors lacked uniform guidance on
what factors to consider when deciding whether to charge a corporation."10 9
In contrast to the testimony of former Attorney General Edwin Meese that
"[c]ompanies reasonably consider each of the Thompson Memorandum factors
to be- mandatory,"' 0 Mr. McNulty asserted that "privilege waiver is often
volunteered or agreed to by a company for specific, business reasons," in order to
expedite the resolution of an investigation. "' Expressing the view that DOJ's
corporate cooperation policies often benefit corporations and their constituents,
he contended that in many instances the Thompson Memorandum actually
caused prosecutors to refrain from charging corporations. This is because it
required them "to consider not simply the legally possible and traditional factors
like the harm done by the crime, but the collateral consequences of their charging
decisions-such as the impact to innocent shareholders."' 2 In a somewhat
fanciful statement in his cover letter to the December 2006 memorandum, Mr.
McNulty declared that DOJ's "corporate charging principles are not only
familiar, but they are welcomed by most corporations in our country because
good corporate leadership shares many of our goals."' 1 3 In a similar vein, Ms.
Immergut described the McNulty Memorandum as the product of a dialog
between DOJ and members of the legal and business communities, particularly
with respect to the new waiver request approval process. 
114
DOJ officials have responded to arguments that corporate cooperation policies
infringe on individual rights in a number of ways. During his tenure as Deputy
Attorney General, Mr. Thompson apparently dismissed concerns over the
chilling effect of DOJ policies on advancement of counsel fees. A 2004 article in
the Wall Street Journal quoted Mr. Thompson as saying "they don't need fancy
legal representation to defend -themselves. There are lots of reasonably priced
108. Immergut Testimony, supra note 101, at 2.
109. Id.
110. Meese Testimony, supra note 5, at 4.
111. McNulty Testimony, supra note 97 at 4.
112. Id. at 2. Cf Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1098 ("[T]he Thompson Memo has prompted prosecutors to
distinguish more readily between companies that deserve to be charged criminally and those that merit lenient
treatment.").
113. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3, at Cover Memorandum 1. Mr. McNulty asserted: "Prosecutors
complain to me that in some instances, corporate counsel run virtually every document through the
corporation's legal department just so that they can assert attorney-client privilege or work product protection.
Some attorneys assert privilege like that famous scene of Lucille Ball gobbling chocolates off of a conveyor
belt." McNulty Testimony, supra note 97, at 5.
114. Immergut Testimony, supra note 101, at 5. The government has underscored the "dialog" with both
carrots and sticks. See, e.g., Deputizing Corporate Counsel, supra note 2, at 35 (discussing KPMG LLP's
decision to cooperate with the government in an effort to avoid indictment and the SEC's 2004 settlement with
Lucent Corp. that included "a $25 million penalty for a supposed lack of cooperation... and a reprimand from
the SEC for indemnifying employees under investigation.").
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lawyers."' 15 Similarly, in 2004, Mary Beth Buchanan, United States Attorney for
the Western District of Pennsylvania, wrote that "[w]hile an employee may have
a legitimate concern, cooperation with the corporation is part of the individual's
employment obligation." 116 Mr. McNulty justified adverse consideration of a
corporation's advancement of legal fees in instances
where that fact, taken together with other facts, gives rise to a real concern that
the corporation is 'circling the wagons,' or, in other words, is using or
conditioning the payment of attorneys' fees as a tool to limit or prevent the
communication of truthful information from current and former employees to
the government in order to protect either the employees or the corporation
itself.11 7
In September 2007 Ms. Immergut took a somewhat more nuanced tack.
Acknowledging the existence of tensions between individual rights and corporate
cooperation, she suggested that the tensions' real source inheres in the artifical
nature of the corporate form. 1 " Ms. Immergut, however, stressed that legislative
interference with DOJ's policies would eliminate corporate incentives to
cooperate with prosecutors, and allow "individual wrongdoers like Jeffery
Skilling and Kenneth Lay to shield their misconduct, and elevate the interests of a
culpable CEO over that of the shareholder."1 9 She asserted that the McNulty
Memorandum strikes the right balance between protecting the attorney-client
privilege and the government's legitimate information requirements."12
Although the reaction of the bar generally has been negative, some commenta-
tors support DOJ's insistence on adherence to the Holder-Thompson-McNulty
approach.' 21 In 2006, former Assistant Attorney General Christopher Wray and
Richard Hur, for example, suggested that, if properly approached, the Thompson
115. Lori P. Cohen, In the Crossfire: Prosecutors' Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against Employees; As
Sentencing Rules Stiffen, KPMG Axes Tax Partners, Won't Pay Their Legal Costs; What Cooperation Entails,
WAU ST. J., June 4, 2004, atA1 (quoted in Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 36).
116. Buchanan, supra note 37, at 602.
117. McNulty Testimony, supra note 97, at 6. According to Mr. McNulty,
You typically see this in combination with other indicators of non-cooperation--overly broad
assertions of corporate representation of employees, a refusal to sanction wrongdoers, a failure to
comply with document subpoenas and a failure to preserve documents. In contrast, when those factors
aren't present.., a company's advancement of legal fees will not cause the same concerns.
Id.
118. Immergut Testimony, supra note 101, at 9.
119. Id. at 10.
120. Id. at 12.
121. See, e.g., Noah D. Stein, Note, Prosecutorial Ethics and the McNulty Memo: Should the Government
Scrutinize an Organization's Payment of Its Employees Attorneys' Fees?, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3245 (2007)
(suggesting that in some circumstances prosecutors should be permitted to consider fee advancement as part of a
totality of the circumstances test of corporate cooperation); John Coffee Says McNulty Memo Went a Bridge Too
Far in Tying Hands of Prosecutors in Corporate Crime Investigations, CoRP. CRIME REP., Jan. 1, 2007, at 1, 16
(cited in Stein, supra, at 32.).
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Memorandum could "continue to serve as a valuable tool for maintaining the
integrity and prosperity of the American marketplace and for ensuring fairness
and consistency in corporate criminal enforcement,"' 12 although they noted
potential pitfalls and acknowledged the risks of misapplication of the Thompson
Memorandum. Law professors Daniel Richman and Michael Siegel both testified
in the September 2007 Senate Judiciary Committee hearings against legislation
constraining DOJ's ability to implement corporate cooperation strategies and
suggested that the McNulty Memorandum, with minor changes, could offer
workable standards.
12 3
Of particular interest for purposes of this discussion, the latter two witnesses
also suggested that the rights of individual employees should be protected in
some fashion. Professor Siegel acknowledged that "[t]he most troubling argu-
ments against privilege waiver stem from the impact it is said to have on the
behavior of corporate employees who face questioning during an internal
investigation and the lack of fairness that the prospect of waiver creates with
respect to these individuals."12 4 He noted that "[t]he remedy lies with the rules
regarding when and how corporate counsel must advise an employee that counsel
does not represent the employee... rules [that] should be strengthened to protect
employees in this situation."12 5 Professor Siegel also emphasized that "care must
be taken to prevent a corporate employee from being double-teamed by the
government and his employer simultaneously ... [and that] the government
should not encourage a cooperating corporation to exercise its authority over an
employee to force the employee's cooperation with the government's investiga-
tion." 
12 6
122. Wray & Hur, supra note 19, at 1188.
123. Examining Approaches to Corporate Fraud Prosecutions and the Attorney-Client Privilege Under the
McNulty Memorandum: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Daniel Richman), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2886&witid=6656 [hereinafter
Richman Testimony]; Examining Approaches to Corporate Fraud Prosecutions and the Attorney-Client
Privilege Under the McNulty Memorandum: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
(statement of Michael Siegel), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2886&witid=6657
[hereinafter Siegel Testimony].
124. Siegel Testimony, supra note 123, at 6.
125. Professor Siegel recommended that "[T]he McNulty memorandum should go further by making clear
that the government will never pressure a company to use any power it holds over an employee (such as the
power of termination) to coerce the employee into individual cooperation." Id. at 7. Surprisingly, he also
suggested, however, that "the employee's trilemma is of her own making; that is, it is a result of her apparent
participation in criminal activity. If she suffers consequences as a result of this behavior-be it termination from
employment or a criminal conviction-she is not a candidate for a whole lot of sympathy," and that "only an
employee truly mired in criminality would suffer [termination] rather than cooperate." Id.
126. Id.
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C. THE ONGOING CAMPAIGN TO ALTER THE McNULTY MEMORANDUM
AND OTHER FEDERAL CORPORATE COOPERATION POLICIES
1. EFFORTS TO INFLUENCE LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICY MAKERS
Although some commentators have argued in favor -of corporate cooperation
policies as important enforcement tools, the overwhelming reaction of the bar has
been negative. DOJ released the McNulty Memorandum on December 12, 2006.
On the same day, ABA President Karen Mathis issued a statement describing the
memorandum as
but a modest improvement over the Department's previous policy as outlined in
the Thompson Memorandum... [that] threatens to further erode the ability of
corporate leaders to seek and obtain the legal guidance they need to effectively
comply with the law ... [and fails to] fully protect employees' legal rights.'
27
In March 2007, in hearings before the House Judiciary Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, Ms. Mathis testified that
"[b]ecause companies will continue to feel extreme pressure to waive in virtually
every case, the 'culture of waiver' created by the Thompson Memorandum will
continue under the McNulty Memorandum. As a result, the applicability of the
privilege will remain highly uncertain in the corporate context."' 128 In a similar
vein, representatives of the Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege
characterized the McNulty modifications as "largely procedural" and unlikely to
"meaningfully diminish the threat that the [Thompson Memorandum] poses to
the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine, employee rights or-as a
result-the ability of organizations to assure compliance or investigate possible
noncompliance." 129 The ABA contends that the McNulty Memorandum contin-
ues to "cause the routine compelled waiver of attorney-client privilege and work
product protections"; further "weaken[s] the attorney-client privilege between
companies and their lawyers and undermines companies' internal compliance
programs"; and "erode[s] employees' legal rights by pressuring companies to
take unfair punitive actions against them during investigations." 3 0 The Coalition
raises particular concerns that the McNulty Memorandum leaves open the
possibility of coercion with respect to discretionary decisions to advance legal
127. Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, Statement by ABA President Karen J. Mathis Regarding Revisions to the
Justice Department's Thompson Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2006), available at http://www.abanet.orglabanetlmedia/
statement/statement.cfm?releaseid=59 [hereinafter Mathis Statement].
128. Mathis March 2007 Testimony, supra note 9, at 6; see also Mathis Statement, supra note 127
.(describing the McNulty Memorandum as "fall[ing] far short of what is needed to prevent further erosion of
fundamental attorney-client privilege, work product, and employee protections... .
129. Coalition March 2006 Testimony, supra note 53, at 4.
130. Id.
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fees to employees; 13  fails to amend language pertaining to joint defense
agreements and information sharing between employers and employees; and
encourages termination of employees who choose to exercise Fifth Amendment
rights. 32 Consequently, both the ABA and the Coalition continue to press DOJ
and other federal agencies to modify these policies, 33 and the ABA has
encouraged its more than 400,000 members to join in the campaign.134 In the
words of a recent Coalition statement, it is necessary to curtail federal corporate
cooperation policies because they "allow prosecutors and enforcement personnel
to assume the mantle of a role properly reserved to courts and judges." 35 These
kinds of concerns also prompted a group of former senior DOJ officials to join in
the effort to persuade DOJ and SEC officials to change direction. 1
36
As of this writing, the ABA, the Coalition and other opponents of the McNulty
Memorandum continue to urge replacement of DOJ's current cooperation
standards, as well as those of the SEC and other agencies, 37 with a different, less
intrusive calculus. (To date, however, neither DOJ nor SEC has agreed to
material changes in the controversial policies. Consequently, the ABA, the
Coalition, and other opponents of federal corporate cooperation also continue to
focus considerable effort on persuading Congress to intervene legislatively to
override federal corporate cooperation strategies.)
2. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES TO CONSTRAIN FEDERAL CORPORATE COOPERATION POLICIES
By 2005, ABA and Coalition efforts to engage Congress in the controversy
over federal corporate cooperation policies1 38 began to bear fruit. In August of
131. Id. at 5; see also Robert S. Bennett, Alan Kriegel, Carl S. Rauh & Charles F. Walker, Internal
Investigations and the Defense of Corporations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 62 Bus. LAW. 55 (2006).
132. Id.
133- See, e.g., Letter of Karen J. Mathis, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Hon. Christopher Cox (Feb. 5, 2007),
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/2007feb05-privwaivsecI .pdf [hereinafter Mathis
SEC letter].
134. See, e.g., Letter of Karen J. Mathis, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to ABA Members (Aug. 7, 2007) (on file
with author); Letter of Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Colleague (May 2, 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomeyclient/materials/stateandlocalbar/20060502OOOOOO.pdf; see also Letters
of Michael S. Greco to State and Local Bar Leaders (Jan. 31, 2006 & June 20, 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomeyclient/materials/stateandlocalbar/home.shtml.
135. Press Release, Coal. to Pres. the Attorney-Client Privilege, Statement Regarding H.R. 3013, "The
Attorney-Client Privilege Act of 2007" (Nov. 13, 2007) (on file with author).
136. See, e.g., Letter of Former Senior DOJ Officials to Hon. Alberto Gonzales (Sept. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/privilegewaiver/2006sepO5-preview-frmrdojtr.pdf. For a list of mem-
bers of signatories, see supra note 54.
137. The ABA has expressed particular concern with factor number 11 pertaining to a company's willingness
to encourage employees to cooperate with SEC investigators and footnote 3 regarding waiver of attorney-client
privilege. See Mathis SEC letter, supra note 133, at 2.
138. See, e.g., Letter from Coal. to Pres. the Attorney-Client Privilege to H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 10,
2005) (on file with author); Letter from Robert B. Evans, Gov't Affairs Office, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Hon. Howard
Coble, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. (Feb. 9,
2005) (on file with author); Letter from Karen J. Mathis, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Sen. Patrick Leahy,
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that year, Representative Dan Lungren wrote to the USSC to support elimination
of all references to waiver of attorney-client and work product protections in the
Organizational Guidelines, 139 and a few months later Representative James F.
Sensenbrenner, then Chiirman of the House Judiciary Committee, and Senator
Arlen Specter, then Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, publicly
questioned DOJ's policies.14
Congress has intervened to overturn DOJ prosecution policies in the past. The
most notable instance of legislative intervention in recent years, known as the
McDade Amendment,14 ' became law in 1999. The McDade Amendment
culminated a bitter ten-year debate over DOJ policies pertaining to the
applicability of state ethics rules corresponding to the prohibitions set forth in
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 against direct contact with persons
known to be represented by counsel.' 42 The dispute involved a policy directive
initiated by Dick Thornburgh during his tenure as Attorney General. In June
1989, Mr. Thornburgh issued a memorandum instructing DOJ attorneys that,
notwithstanding contrary state ethics rules, they could communicate directly with
"any person who has not been made the subject of formal federal adversarial
proceedings arising from that investigation, regardless of whether that person is
known to be represented by counsel."' 143 Subsequently, under Mr. Thornburgh's
successor, Attorney General Janet Reno, DOJ promulgated regulations permit-
ting its attorneys to make direct contact with employees of organizations under
investigation, even if the organization was represented by counsel, provided that
the employees were not at a high level in the organization or "known by the
government to be participating as a decision maker in the determination of the
organization's legal position. ' 44 Ultimately, despite DOJ's reliance on the
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary (June 4, 2007) (on file with author) (advocating support for passage of S.
186, the "Attorney-Client Protection Act of 2007" on grounds that the McNulty Memorandum "falls far short of
what is needed to prevent further erosion of fundamental attorney-client privilege, work product, and employee
legal protections").
139. Letter from Rep. Dan Lundgren to Hon. Ricardo H. Hinojosa (Aug. 15, 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclientlmaterials/048/048.pdf.
140. See Sen. Arlen Specter, Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce/ABA/ACLU/NACDL Conference
on Erosion of the Attorney-Client Privilege: What Does the Future Hold? (Nov. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/acpriv-transcriptofsenspecterll-16-05.pdf; Rep. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Re-
marks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce/ABA/ACLU/NACDL Conference on Erosion of the Attorney-Client
Privilege: What Does the Future Hold?.(Nov. 16, 2005), available at http://www.abanet.orglpoladv/documentsl
acprivsensenbrenner1 1- 16-05.pdf.
141. Pub. L. No. 105-227, 111 Stat. 2440 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A).
142. For discussion of the McDade Amendment, see, e.g., Grefory B. LeDonne, Note, Revisiting the
McDade Amendment: Finding the Appropriate Solution for the Federal Government Lawyer, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 231 (2007); Joan Colson, Note, Rule of Ethics or Substantive Law: Who Controls an Individual's Right to
Choose a Lawyer in Today's Corporate Environment, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1265, 1269-74 (2005); Fred C.
Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000).
143. Memorandum of Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General, Communication with Persons Represented by
Counsel (June 8, 1989), reprinted in Matter of Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 492-93 (D.N.M. 1992)
144. 28 C.F.R. Part 77, Fed. Reg. Vol. 59, No. 149 (1994).
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Supremacy Clause to argue that federal law enforcement policy trumped state
ethics rules, Congress legislatively overruled DOJ. 14 5 The McDade Amendment
specifically requires government attorneys to abide by the ethics rules of the
states in which they practice.' 46
a. S. 186 and H.R. 3013
Mindful of the McDade Amendment precedent, opponents of DOJ's corporate
cooperation policies consistently have sought legislative intervention to override
first the Thompson Memorandum and then the McNulty Memorandum. As noted
earlier, shortly before the USSC's April 2006 decision to delete the waiver
language of Advisory Committee note 8C2.5, the House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security held the first
Congressional hearings on federal corporate cooperation policies. 147 The Senate
Judiciary Committee subsequently convened hearings in September 2006,148 and
in December 2006 Senator Specter introduced legislation designed to address the
corporate cooperation debate. 1
4 9
S. 186, the bill currently pending in the Senate, would create the "Attorney-
Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007" for purposes of delineating "clear and
practical limits designed to preserve the attorney-client privilege and work
product protections available to an organization and preserve the constitutional
rights and other legal protections available to employees of such an organiza-
tion."'1 50 The pivotal provisions of S. 186 state:
In any Federal investigation or criminal or civil enforcement matter, an agent or
attorney of the United States shall not-
(1) demand, request, or condition treatment on the disclosure by an organiza-
tion, or person affiliated with that organization, of any communication
protected by the attorney-client privilege or any attorney work product;
(2) condition a civil or criminal charging decision relating [t]o a [sic]
organization, or person affiliated with that organization, on, or use as a factor in
determining whether an organization, or person affiliated with that organiza-
tion, is cooperating with the Government-
(A) any valid assertion of the attorney-client privilege or privilege for attorney
work product;
145. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L.
No.105-277, § 801, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-118 (1998).
146. Id.
147. See supra text accompanying note 61.
148. The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (2006), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=2054.
149. S. 30, 109th Cong. (2006).
150. S. 186, 110th Cong. § 3 (as received by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Nov. 14, 2007).
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(3) the provision of counsel to, or contribution to the legal defense fees or
expenses of, an employee of that organization;
(C) the entry into a joint defense, information sharing, or common interest
agreement with an employee of that organization if the organization determines
it has a common interest in defending against the investigation or enforcement
matter;
(D) the sharing of information relevant to the investigation or enforcement
matter with an employee of that organization; or
(E) a failure to terminate the employment of or otherwise sanction any
employee of that organization because of the decision by that employee to
exercise the constitutional rights or other legal protections of that employee or
other legal protections of that employee in response to a Government request;
or
(3) demand or request that an organization, not take any action described in
paragraph (2). 151
The legislation, however, would nbt "prohibit an organization from making, or
an agent or attorney of the United States from accepting, a voluntary and
unsolicited offer to share the internal investigation material of such organiza-
tion."
15 2
In March 2007, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security again held hearings on the controversy, specifically to
examine "[tihe McNulty Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in
Corporate Investigations." 153 On July 12, 2007, Representative Scott and several
co-sponsors 154 introduced H.R. 3013, the House counterpart of S. 186.155 The
House moved relatively quickly to address the proposed legislation. On August 1,
2007, the House Judiciary Committee reported out the bill.
156
b. The September 2007 Hearings
On September 18, 2007, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on
"Examining Approaches to Corporate Fraud Prosecutions and the Attorney-
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. The McNultyMemorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, l10th
Cong. (2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/oversight.aspx?ID=281.
154. Representative Robert Scott is a Democrat from Virginia. Cosponsors at the time the House passed H.R.
3013 included Representatives; Melissa Bean (D-Illinois), Howard Coble (R-North Carolina), John Conyers, Jr.
(D-Michigan), Artur Davis (D-Alabama), William Delahun (D-Massachusetts), Tom Feeney (R-Florida), J.
Randy Forbes (R-Virginia), Daniel Lungeren (R-California), Jerrold Nadler (D- New York), Peter Roskam
(R-Illinois), and Lamar Smith (R-Texas).
155. H.R. 3013, 110th Cong. (2007).
156. See Transcript of House Comm. on the Judiciary Markup of H.R. 3013, the "Attorney-Client Protection
Act of 2007" (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/Markup.aspx?ID = 180.
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Client Privilege Under the McNulty Memorandum."' 57 This round of hearings
featured testimony discussed earlier from Ms. Inmergut and Professors Richman
an Siegel in support of DOJ's position. 158 In addition to statements from the ABA
and the Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client Privilege,1 59 former Attorney
General Dick Thornburgh, a member of the group of former senior DOJ offi-
cials,' 6 testified in support of legislative action. He characterized the McNulty
Memorandum as little different from its predecessor:
No matter what its procedural requirements or how reasonably the Justice
Department may promise to implement it, a waiver policy poses overwhelming
temptations to target organizations, often desperate to save their very existence.
Prosecutors do not need to issue express requests for privileged documents to
receive them. The same insidious result arises from policies that offer credit to
organizations if they take adverse actions against employees that prosecutors
.deem culpable.
1 6 1
Andrew .Weissmann, former Director of DOJ's Enron Task Force, joined in
testifying in favor of Congressional action to override the McNulty Memoran-
dum. He stressed four points. First, corporations of significant size are likely to be
subject to investigation and prosecution at some point and "the mere indictment
of a company carries with it the risk of it being the equivalent of a death sentence
for the company and resulting in severe consequences to hundreds or even
thousands of innocent people." 162 Second, a lack of national oversight by Main
157. See Examining Approaches to Corporate Fraud Prosecutions and the Attorney-Client Privilege under




160. In a July 30, 2007, letter to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the former DOJ officials
continue to stress their belief "that the McNulty Memorandum maintains the fundamental flaws of the prior
regime." Letter from Stuart M. Gerson, Edwin Meese Il, Richard Thornburgh, Carol E. Dinkins, Jamie
Gorelick, Walter E Dellinger, In, Theodore B. Olson, Kenneth.W. Starr, and Seth P. Waxman to the Hon. Patrick
Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary; Hon. Arlen Specter, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the
Judiciary; Hon. John T. Conyers, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary; and Hon. Lamar S. Smith, Ranking
Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary (July 30, 2007), http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/
privilegewaiver/ (follow link to letter).
161. Examining Approaches to Corporate Fraud Prosecutions and the Attorney-Client Privilege Under the
McNulty Memorandum: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Richard Thomburgh), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2886&wit-id=6654.
162. Weissmann Testimony, supra note 11, at 5. Mr. Weissmann explained:
The McNulty Memorandum's examples of purported "purely factual" information illustrate the
problem. As examples of "purely factual" material, the memorandum lists: "witness statements, or
purely factual interview memoranda regarding the underlying misconduct, organization charts
created by company counsel, factual chronologies, factual summaries, or reports (or portions thereof)
containing investigative facts documented by counsel." But who an attorney interviews, what
questions an attorney asks, and what information is chosen as important to memorialize can reveal
important information about the company's defense strategy and the attorney's evaluation of the
strength and weaknesses of the issues in a particular case. For this reason, courts have repeatedly held
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Justice over decisions to charge corporations exacerbates the risk of current
policies, especially in light of the relative inexperience of many line prosecutors
in corporate matters. 163 Third, DOJ policies unfairly impact individuals and tend
to reward companies that punish employees for asserting their constitutional
rights. Fourth, federal corporate cooperation strategies undermine the attorney-
client privilege, particularly because much of the material described by the
McNulty Memorandum as "purely factual" is protected by the attorney-client
and/or work product privileges."
The committee also received a statement from a highly respected and
influential newcomer to the proceedings-Delaware's former Chief Justice E.
Norman Veasey. 165 Chief Justice Veasey summarized information from defense
counsel reporting on encounters with prosecutors using heavy handed tactics to
obtain corporate cooperation, Chief Justice Veasey noted accounts of prosecutors
ridiculing the idea that they needed to obtain permission from Main Justice to
proceed with waiver requests or to construe advancement of attorneys' fees to
employees against a company. 166 Chief Justice Veasey concluded with the
observation that "the defense rights of employees and decisions regarding the
application of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine are
protections the courts, not the executive branch, should regulate." 167 He stressed
that the critical question "is whether Congress should enact legislation that will
require prosecutors to return to practices that successfully served them for
decades and were acknowledged as fair to all parties involved." 168
Following the September 2007 effort to persuade Congress to intervene in the
corporate cooperation controversy continued to build momentum. On November
13, 2007, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3013.169 As of this writing, it
remains unclear whether S. 186 will garner enough support to result in
legislation.
that "[how a party, its counsel and agents choose to prepare their case, the efforts they undertake, and
the people they interview is not factual information to which an adversary is entitled." Yet the
McNulty Memorandum simply ignores this case law and its unassailable logic and abrogates to itself
the determination that material that has heretofore been widely deemed to be privileged is not entitled
to protection under the Memorandum.
Id.
163. Id. at2.
164. There are many ways for companies to provide the government with valuable information without
waiving privilege protections. For instance, a company can provide the government with nonprivileged
documents that will further the investigation and steer investigators to company employees with critical
information. They can also proffer salient information through their attorneys.
165. Letter of E. Norman Veasey to S. Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 13,2007) [hereinafter Veasey Report],
available at http://acc.comipublic/veasey.pdf.
166. See id. at 13.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. CoNo. REc. H 13,562-63 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2007).
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3. THE POTENTIAL IMPAcr OF POLICY CHANGES AND LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION
The threat of legislative action to constrain federal corporate cooperation
strategies was undoubtedly a factor in persuading DOJ to modify the Thompson
Memorandum.' 7 0 Nevertheless, despite ongoing opposition to the McNulty
Memorandum, to date efforts to persuade DOJ and other federal agencies, to
make major changes to their corporate cooperation policies have been unsuccess-
ful. Congress undoubtedly could place significant limitations on the ability of
prosecutors and other government attorneys to demand waivers of corporate
attorney-client privilege and work product protections or consider employee
financial support in making charging decisions, but the overall impact of
legislative change may not be quite as striking as proponents hope. Given the vast
array of federal crimes and the number of potential defendants within the purview
of every U.S. Attorney's office, prosecutors necessarily must exercise discretion
in determining investigative targets and the nature of any charges to be filed.
Consequently, legislative intervention in the corporate cooperation controversy
would be unlikely to have results as dramatic as the McDade Amendment.
The McDade Amendment directly addressed DOJ instructions that permitted
government attorneys to disregard state professional ethics rules. Following the
enactment of the new law it was a relatively straight-forward matter to ensure
compliance by holding government attorneys to the same standards as other
attorneys in particular jurisdictions.17 ' The situation is somewhat different with
respect to federal corporate cooperation policies. First, as Mr. McNulty himself
pointed out, there is a transparency issue.1 72 Prosecutors operating with finite
resources will inevitably select some corporations to prosecute and permit others
to sidestep the criminal process. Somehow prosecutors need to decide which
organizations to charge.173 In the absence of mandatory policies like those set
forth in the McNulty Memorandum, prosecutors need not focus on factors such
as privilege waiver, advancement of attorneys' fees or other specific criteria. It
blinks reality, however, to suggest that they will ignore corporate cooperation in
exercising their prosecutorial discretion.1 74 Even more importantly, neither S.
186 nor H.R. 3013 blocks voluntary waiver of attorney-client privilege or work
product protections. 175 Indeed, it would be impractical and counterproductive to
do so, but in light of the relevant history, many corporations are likely to continue
170. See sources cited supra note 25.
171. Of course, problems of multi-jurisdictional practice confront prosecutors just as they do other attorneys.
172. See supra Part I.B.2.
173. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 2, at 312 ("Given the enormous number of federal crimes and the limited
number of federal judges, the Justice Department can bring only a relatively small number of criminal cases...
[s]o the Department is highly selective.").
174. Cf Weissmann Testimony, supra note 1 I(discussing enormous leverage of prosecutors because of
consequences of indictment for business entitites).
175. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
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to "volunteer" cooperation for some time in the hope of placating prosecutors and
diverting their attention elsewhere. 
176
If the pending bills become law, they will have a significant impact, but
whether even federal legislation is unlikely to undo the prevailing "culture of
waiver."177 Whether or not Congress acts, it seems likely that individual rights
will remain at risk for some time to come.
II. UNITED STATES V. STEIN
Perhaps the most dramatic events in the battle over corporate cooperation
policies have taken place in a courtroom in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in connection with the investigation of KPMG
LLP and several former KPMG partners and employees for tax fraud. The
following sections discuss the KPMG matter and the potential impact of Judge
Kaplan's decisions.
A. THE 2006 STATE ACTION HOLDING, SUPPRESSION AND ATTORNEYS'
FEES DECISIONS
1. THE STATE ACTION DECISION
17 8
In 2002, the Internal Revenue Service initiated an investigation into a matter
reported to be the largest tax shelter fraud in United States history.1 79 Shortly
thereafter, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Commit-
tee on Governmental Affairs held hearings on the alleged fraud.180 Witnesses
included several current and former KPMG partners and employees;181 they did
not receive a friendly reception.1 8 2 Concerned about the hostile reaction to
KPMG partners in the Senate hearing and well aware of Arthur Andersen's fate,
KPMG's chair moved quickly to find a way to avoid indictment.18 3 The firm
retained well known defense attorney Robert Bennett of Skadden Arps Slate
Meagher & Flom and instructed him to find "a new cooperative approach" to
176. Even in the absence of other consequences, the specter of shareholder derivative lawsuits and other civil
proceedings looms large for the directors and officers of corporations facing criminal prosecutions and civil
enforcement actions. So long as corporate managers face the possibility of significant personal liability as a
result of corporate criminal violations, they are likely to want to do everything possible to minimize the risk to
the entities they serve, including cooperating with the government against employees.
177. United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
178. The term "state action" is used broadly herein to connote action by the federal government as well as
state or local governments.
179. See Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d, at 338.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 338-39.
183. Id.
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save the firm.'4 KPMG then "cleaned house" by terminating a number of senior
personnel. 85 The firm asked several senior partners to leave, including deputy
chair Jeffrey Stein. The firm negotiated a generous retirement agreement with Mr.
Stein, including a promise that the firm would pay counsel fees he incurred in
defending charges related to his tenure at KPMG.1
86
Despite its housecleaning, KPMG's efforts to prevent a criminal referral to
DOJ proved unsuccessful. 1 87 Early in 2004, the United States Attorney's Office
for the Southern District of New York opened an investigation into the matter and
issued "subject" letters 88 to somewhere between twenty and thirty KPMG
partners and employees. 89 A few weeks after the U.S. Attorney's Office issued
the letters, KPMG's counsel met with government attorneys.' 90 Although
KPMG's lawyers emphasized the firm's intent to cooperate fully with the
government, they also noted that KPMG was contemplating advancing counsel
fees to current and former partners and employees involved in the investigation
and sought the government's view on the plan.' 9 ' Judge Kaplan found that the
prosecutors' responses to KPMG's counsel in exchanges that followed during
and after the initial meeting underscored the threat inherent in the Thompson
Memorandum-that prosecutors would consider advancement of counsel fees to
"culpable" employees as evidence of a non-cooperative attitude on the part of an
organization under investigation. In the court's view, "While the USAO did not
say in so many words that it did not want KPMG to pay legal fees, no one at the
meeting could have failed to draw that conclusion."' 192 Subsequent events
emphasized the point. KPMG responded to negative indications from prosecutors
with a novel approach. The firm offered to advance counsel fees to individuals
under investigation, but only upon their agreement to cooperate fully and inform
the government of the plan.' 93 KPMG applied this policy to everyone under
investigation, including Mr. Stein.1
94
During the next two years prosecutors and KPMG lawyers regularly communi-
cated about employees' cooperation with the government. Judge Kaplan found
that "the government took full advantage" 195 of KPMG's eagerness to cooperate,









192. Id. at 344.
193. Id. at 346-47.
194. Id.*
195. Id. at 347.
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comply with the government demands."' 196 KPMG advised the individuals'
counsel that the payments would cease if their clients refused to cooperate, then
cut off payments to those who failed to comply with government interview
demands. 197 In August 2005, KPMG entered into a deferred prosecution
agreement in which the firm agreed to cooperate fully with the government. 198 In
August 2005, the grand jury indicted nineteen individuals, including sixteen
former KPMG partners and employees, in connection with the alleged tax
fraud. 199
Shortly thereafter in January 2006, the individual defendants formerly
associated with KPMG ("the KPMG defendants") moved either to dismiss the
indictments against them or to obtain alternative relief.2°° In so doing, the KPMG
defendants raised a question that had been hovering at the margins of the
corporate cooperation controversy for several years: Whether the conduct of a
business entity in connection with a criminal investigation will be attributed to
the government if prosecutors encourage the entity to coerce its employees to
cooperate in the investigation? 201 Ruling on the motions, Judge Kaplan
characterized this question as one "aris[ing] at the intersection of three principles
of American law"-the Fifth Amendment substantive due process right to a
fundamentally fair trial, the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, and
the principle that "an employer often must reimburse an employee for legal
expenses when the employee is sued, or even charged with a crime, as a result of
doing his or her job., 20 2 The court concluded that the government-through the
actions of prosecutors from the United States Attorneys Office for the Southern
District of New York in combination with the impact of the Thompson
Memorandum-had violated the constitutional rights of several KPMG defen-
dants.203
In its analysis, the court noted the evolution of DOJ's formal corporate
cooperation policies 2°4 and then recounted the history of KPMG's interactions
with the government following the initiation of the tax shelter investigation. In
particular, the court emphasized three key facts stipulated to by the parties. First,
although neither KPMG's partnership agreement nor its bylaws addressed




199. Id. at 349. One of the original seventeen KPMG defendants pled guilty. See United States v. Stein (Stein
If), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
200. Stein 1, 435 F Supp. 2d at 350.
201. See id. at 335.
202. Id.
203. Id. It bears mentioning that the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York earlier had
called for complete waivers of attorney-client privilege and work product protections by targeted companies.
See American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 2, at 330 ns.98-99.
204. Stein 1, 435 F Supp. 2d at 338.
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advancing legal fees without preset caps or conditions such as cooperation with
20the government. 05 Second, KPMG had adhered to this practice without regard to
defense costs, paying more than $20 million in fees to defend four partners in one
criminal investigation and related SEC inquiry.2°6 Third, at least since 1974,
KPMG had never denied advancement of legal fees to any partner or em-
ployee.2°7
Judge Kaplan stressed that once KPMG decided to cooperate, the firm worked
tirelessly to persuade the government not to indict the partnership by "touting its
cooperation with the investigation and its limitation of attorneys' fees for
individuals. '20 8 The court concluded that the Thompson Memorandum caused
KPMG to consider departing from its longstanding fee advancement policy;
prosecutors deliberately reinforced the threat inherent in the Thompson Memoran-
dum; and the government's conduct revealed a desire to minimize the involve-
ment of defense attorneys for the individuals it deemed culpable. Most
significantly, the court found that "KPMG's decision to cut off all payments of
legal fees and expenses to anyone who was indicted and to limit and to condition
such payments prior to indictment upon cooperation with the government was the
direct consequence of the pressure applied by the Thompson Memorandum and
the USAO.' 209
Judge Kaplan then considered the individuals' claims that the government's
conduct violated constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. The court began by examining the parameters of the Fifth
Amendment right to a fundamentally fair trial, emphasizing that "the government
may not both prosecute a defendant and then seek to influence the manner in
which he or she defends the case."2 10 Judge Kaplan observed that the defense of a
case of the magnitude of the KPMG litigation requires significant resources, and
that "the government ha[d] interfered with the ability of the KPMG Defendants to
obtain resources they would otherwise have had,"211 as well as their choice of
counsel.2 12 Turning to the Thompson Memorandum and its impact, the court
criticized the memorandum insofar as it was directed toward "punish[ing] those
whom prosecutors deem culpable" by "depriving employees of corporate aid."2 13
Judge Kaplan admonished: "The job of prosecutors is to make the government's
best case to a jury and to let the jury decide guilt or innocence.
214
205. Id. at 340.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 348.
209. Id. at 352-53.
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The court analyzed "the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings [as] a
fundamental liberty interest subject to substantive due process protection. ' 21 5
Judge Kaplan observed that the investigation at issue was "no garden-variety
criminal case," but "the largest tax fraud case in United States history. ' 216 He
concluded that "[t]here is no necessary inconsistency between an entity
cooperating with the government and, at the same time paying defense costs of
individual employees and former employees. 21 7 Accordingly, the court held that
"the Thompson Memorandum [was] not narrowly tailored to achieve a compel-
ling objective. 21 8 Citing testimony by KPMG's new chief legal officer, former
U.S. District Judge Sven Erik Holmes, Judge Kaplan concluded that "[flew if any
competent defense lawyers would advise a corporate client at risk of indictment
that it should feel free to advance legal fees to individuals," because to do so
might appear to be protecting culpable employees.21 9 Consequently, in practice
the Thompson Memorandum operated to discourage advancement of legal
fees.220 The court further reasoned that the prosecutors handling the KPMG
matter
understood... that the threat inherent in the Thompson Memorandum, coupled
with their own reinforcement of that threat, was likely to produce exactly the
result that occurred-KPMG's determination to cut off the payment of legal
fees for any employees or former employees who were indicted and to limit and
condition their payment during the investigative stage.221
The court therefore concluded that, like the Thompson Memorandum, the
prosecutors' actions could not withstand strict scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause.222
Judge Kaplan then turned to the KPMG defendants' Sixth Amendment claims.
After canvassing relevant precedent, the court held that the government had acted
with the purpose of minimizing the defendants' access to resources necessary to
mount their defenses or, at least, "in reckless disregard that this would be the
likely result of its actions. 223 In the court's view: "The Thompson Memorandum
discourages and, as a practical matter, often prevents companies from providing
employees and former employees with the financial means to exercise their
constitutional rights to defend themselves ... [and] undermines the proper
215. Id. at 361.
216. Id. at 362.




221. Id. at 365.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 366.
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functioning of the adversary process that the Constitution adopted., 224 The court
viewed the events at issue as creating a structural error that permeated the entire
proceedings against the KPMG defendants.22 5 Concluding that the KPMG
defendants did not need to establish prejudice, and that it was present in any
event, the Court held that the government had violated the KPMG Defendants'
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.226
Finally, the court turned to the question of remedy. Judge Kaplan rejected the
possibility of ordering the government to pay the KPMG defendants' counsel fees
as prohibited by sovereign immunity principles.22 7 Rather than dismiss the
indictments, however, the court held that it could exercise ancillary jurisdiction
over the fee dispute matter and order KPMG to pay the individuals' legal fees.228
The court informed the parties that it would open a civil case file and permit the
individual defendants to file complaints seeking to compel KPMG to pay their
legal fees. 2 9
2. THE COURT'S RULING ON THE SUPPRESSION MOTIONS
A few weeks later, the court ruled on motions filed by nine of the KPMG
defendants to suppress statements previously made to the government.23 ° Judge
Kaplan held that, as a result of the pressure it had exerted on KPMG, the
government had improperly coerced statements from two of the nine moving
defendants.2 3 ' The court, denied the other motions to suppress, because the
defendants failed to establish that they would not have made the statements they
sought to exclude but for the government's improper conduct. 23 2 The Court held
that "state action will be found where the government commands or significantly
encourages a private entity to take the specific action alleged to violate the Fifth
Amendment, as well as where the government is 'entwined' in the management
or control of specific conduct at issue, ' 233 In so doing, Judge Kaplan cited the
Supreme Court's decision in Garrity v. New Jersey234 for the proposition that




227. Id. at 374-76.
228. Id. at 378.
229. Id. at 380. The court gave the KPMG defendants fourteen days to file their complaints, obtain
summonses, and serve KPMG and remarked that they also could seek declaratory relief and an expedited
hearing. Id.
230. United States v. Stein, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326-30, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
231. Id. at 331, 333.
232. Id. at 330.
233. Id.
234. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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economically coercive means, whether they are direct or indirect., 235
In light of this analysis, Judge Kaplan found "that the government, both
through the Thompson Memorandum and the actions of the USAO, quite
deliberately coerced, and in any case significantly encouraged, KPMG to
pressure its employees to surrender their Fifth Amendment rights. 236 Accord-
ingly, the court suppressed the statements made by two of the KPMG
defendants.2 37
3. ThE FEE LTGATION
Meanwhile, in accordance with Judge Kaplan's June 6th ruling, the KPMG
defendants filed civil actions seeking to compel the firm to advance counsel
fees.238 KPMG moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction or,
alternatively, to compel arbitration on the fee issue.239 In a decision issued on
September 6, 2006, the court treated KPMG's pleading as a motion for summary
judgment, denied it, and set the case for trial.24°
B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S RULING ON ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
Following the district court's September 6th order, KPMG appealed both the
district court's assertion of ancillary jurisdiction and the denial of the firm's
motion to compel arbitration to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.24 After reviewing the jurisdictional complexities relevant to the
proceedings, the Second Circuit decided to treat the matter as a motion for a writ
of mandamus against the District Court.242 The appellate court then vacated the
portions of Judge Kaplan's June 6th and September 6th orders to the extent that
they asserted ancillary jurisdiction over KPMG with respect to the fee claims.
2 43
The court held that it was beyond the power of the district court to assert
jurisdiction in these circumstances, and it dismissed the fee payment issue
complaint against KPMG. 24 In so doing, the appellate court noted that it viewed
the necessity of initiating an ancillary proceeding as "far less pressing" than
Judge Kaplan, observing that more direct remedies were available, such as
dismissal of the indictments against individuals whose Fifth and Sixth Amend-
235. United States v. Stein, 440 F Supp. 2d at 326 (quoting Garrity, 385 U.S. at 496).
236. Id. at 337.
237. Id. at 338.
238. United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230 (S.D.N.Y 2006).
239. Id. at 237-39.
240. Md
241. Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753, 775-76 (2d Cir. 2007).
242. Id. at 756.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 764.
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ment rights were violated.24 5 The appellate court, however, specifically declined
to express any opinion on the merits of the criminal case. 2 6
C. THE 2007 ORDER DISMISSING INDICTMENTS AGAINST THIRTEEN KPMG
DEFENDANTS
In July 2007, on remand following the Second Circuit's grant of mandamus,
Judge Kaplan dismissed the indictments against thirteen of the sixteen individual
KPMG defendants.2 47 The court began its analysis by reexamining the factual
bases of its Stein I decision in response to the government's claim that the court's
constitutional holdings rested on clearly erroneous findings of fact.248 In so
doing, the court emphasized that both "the Bar in general and KPMG's counsel in
particular" shared the Court's understanding that the Thompson Memorandum
"discourage[d] payment of legal fees for company employees by increasing the
risk of indictment of a company under investigation that chooses to make such
payments. '249 The court cited various communications and Congressional
testimony authored by the ABA and the Coalition to Preserve the Attorney-Client
Privilege, among others, 250 and noted the admonition of another District Judge
that the Thompson Memorandum was "fraught with risk of constitutional
harm.",251 Judge Kaplan also cited a recent work co-authored by KPMG counsel
Robert Bennett advising businesses against fee advancement because of the risk
that they would be deemed uncooperative by prosecutors;252 as well as several
law review articles.253 The Court forcefully stated that the Thompson Memoran-
dum had influenced KPMG and its counsel even before the pivotal meetings with
prosecutors, reiterating that the critical decisions with respect to payment of
attorneys' fees "were prompted by the Thompson Memorandum and the USAO's
negative reaction ... to the possibility that KPMG would pay any legal fees in the
absence of a legal obligation to do so, despite ample evidence that KPMG would
otherwise have advanced these costs. ' 2 5 4 Judge Kaplan further noted that KPMG
had paid counsel fees for eleven of the KPMG defendants in related civil
litigation, citing new evidence that had come to light since Stein L255
245. Id. at 762.
246. Id.
247. United States v. Stein (Stein 11) 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
248. Id. at 393 & n. 1.
249. Id. at 397.
250. Id. at 397-98.
251. Id. at 397 (citing United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 721, 737 (E.D. Va. 2007)).
252. Stein IL 495 F. Supp. 2d at 398 & n.23 (citing Robert S. Bennett, The Role of Internal Investigations in
Defending Corporations Against Charges of Foreign Bribery (Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP,
Washington, D.C.), 2005 at 17, 19, available at http://skadden.com/fcpa/index.php?documentlD=28&
sectionlD=32). See also Bennett, et al., supra note 131, at 60 & n.16.
253. Stein 11, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 339 & n.28.
254. Id. at 404.
255. Id. at 406.
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After reaffirming the validity of its earlier factual findings, the court revisited
its legal analysis, focusing on the substantive due process holding. The court
clarified that it viewed the Thompson Memorandum as a regulation in substance.
Judge Kaplan therefore analyzed the memorandum as legislation rather than
employing the "shocking to the conscience" standard applicable to the acts of
government officials.256 In the court's view, "a substantive due process challenge
to the Thompson Memorandum properly is analyzed first by determining whether
it impinged upon a fundamental right, and if it did, by then considering whether it
was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. '257 Judge
Kaplan ruled that the Thompson Memorandum was insufficiently narrowly
tailored to pass muster. He also concluded that the KPMG prosecutors'
"deliberate interference with the defendants' rights was outrageous and shocking
in the constitutional sense because it was fundamentally at odds with two of our
most basic constitutional values-the right to counsel and the right to fair
criminal proceedings. 258 The court, however, emphasized that it would have
reached the same result, whether the relevant measure was deliberate indifference
or the shocking to the conscience standard.259
The court then reviewed the impact of the government's conduct on the KPMG
defendants, noting the millions of documents in both electronic and tangible form
produced by the government,26° as well as the complexity of pretrial notions and
the anticipated length and scope of trial.261 Judge Kaplan concluded that the
preparation of counsel for the KPMG defendants had been constrained by the
firm's refusal to advance attorneys' fees. This refusal "caused [the individuals] to
restrict the activities of their counsel" in pretrial motions practice and other
important respects "and/or left them without information technology assistance
necessary for dealing with the mountains of electronic discovery.,
262
Finally, the court returned to the question of remedy. Rejecting the govern-
ment's arguments with respect to the availability of Criminal Justice Act funds to
defendants in need of financial assistance,263 and stressing that the government
had denied the KPMG defendants their choice of counsel,2 6 the court concluded
that none of the KPMG defendants could "afford to defend this case at any
meaningful level."265 Although it emphasized that the there is no constitutional
256. Id. at 412.
257. Id.





263. Id. at 420 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2004)) (maximum of $7000 available to financially eligible
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guarantee of "a 'Dream Team' or a multimillion dollar defense," the court held
that the Constitution does guarantee those who can afford it the
right to spend their money for the liest (or what is not always the same thing, the
most expensive) defense that money can buy, free of unjustified interference by
the government... and prevents the government from interfering if a criminal
defendant is fortunate enough to have someone who is willing to give the
defendant the money to pay for a defense, even a very expensive one.266
On the basis of this reasoning, the court dismissed the indictments against
thirteen of the sixteen KPMG defendants.267 It denied the other three KPMG
defendants' motions to dismiss on grounds that they had failed to establish that
KPMG would have paid their defense costs absent the government's miscOn-
duct.
268
In reaching the decision to dismiss the indictments, the court stressed "that
prosecutors can and should be aggressive in the pursuit of the public interest....
But there are limits on the permissible actions of even the best prosecutors. 269
Judge Kaplan closed with a pointed statement about the Thompson Memoran-
dum and the government's conduct:
The Department of Justice in promulgating the aspects of the Thompson
Memorandum here at issue, and the USAO ... deliberately or callously
prevented many of these defendants from obtaining funds for their defense that
they lawfully would have had absent the government's interference. They
thereby foreclosed these defendants from presenting the defenses they wished
to present and, in some cases, even deprived them of counsel of their choice.
This is intolerable in a society that holds itself out to the world as a paragon of
justice. The responsibility for the dismissal of this indictment as to thirteen
defendants lies with the government.
270
D. THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE STEIN RULINGS
Judge Kaplan's rulings in the KPMG prosecutions breathed new life into the
state action doctrine in the context of corporate cooperation, particularly because
the court took such care to lay out the analysis supporting its rulings.27 t
Nevertheless, it seems unwise to place too much stock in state action jurispru-
266. Id. at 425.
267. Id. at 427.
268. Id. at 425-27.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. As noted above, the state action issue hovered at the margins of the corporate cooperation controversy
for several years prior to Judge Kaplan's initial ruling. See, e.g., Joseph F. Coyne & Charles F Barker,
Employees'Rights and Duties During an Internal Investigation, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONs at 175
(Brad D. Brian et al eds., 2d ed. 2002); Randall J. Turk, The Interview Process, in INTERNAL CORPORATE
INVESTIGATIONS, supra, at 99-107.
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dence as a constraint on federal corporate cooperation strategies for several
* reasons. First, despite Judge Kaplan's analysis and academic literature suggesting
other bases to find state action in connection with the impact of corporate
cooperation policies, 2  it remains to be seen whether the Second Circuit will
uphold the district court's dismissal of the indictments and whether other federal
courts will agree with Judge Kaplan's reasoning. Judge Kaplan rejected the
government's argument that Sixth Amendment rights attach only upon the formal
initiation of adversarial proceedings.273 Second, the nature of the issues at stake
makes it unlikely that these types of cases will get to the courts in significant
numbers.274 Third, even judicial decisions in favor of individual defendants are
unlikely to diminish the in terrorem effect of the McNulty Memorandum or
undercut the "culture of waiver" for some time to come, particularly in light of
the fact-specific nature of state-action jurisprudence, the inconsistency of
Supreme Court precedent,275 and the potentially draconian consequences of
indictment for companies.
276
1. THE STEIN ANALYSIS AS PRECEDENT FOR STATE ACTION HoLDINGS
The threshold question is whether the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit will uphold Judge Kaplan's dismissal of the indictments of the
thirteen KPMG defendants. In granting mandamus and vacating the district
court's assertion of ancillary jurisdiction over KPMG, the Second Circuit
emphasized that it "express[ed] no opinion" on Judge Kaplan's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rulings.277 As noted above, in the district court's July 2007 ruling
Judge Kaplan cited language from an opinion of Judge T.S. Ellis, III of the
Eastern District of Virginia commenting on the constitutional dangers inherent in
the Thompson Memorandum.278 However, at least one district court has
disagreed with Judge Kaplan's Stein I analysis. In United States v. Stodder,27 9 the
United Sates District Court for the Central District of California found the Stein
272. See infra text accompanying notes 293-313.
273. United States v. Stein.(Stein 1) 435 F Supp. 2d 330, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). See United States v. Rosen,
487 F. Supp. 2d 721, 723-33 (E.D. Va. 2007) (discussing question of when right to counsel attaches in decision
denying defendants' claim on grounds of lack of prejudice).
274. Yet, as Professor Griffin observes, "executive branch self-regulation in the McNulty Memorandum does
not.., provide clear remedies or sufficient protection. Griffin, supra note 2, at 380.
275. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCiPLES AND POLICIES, 517 (3d ed. 2006) (noting
inconsistencies and unresolved tensions in state action jurisprudence and resulting confusion).
276. See supra text accompanying note 5.
277. Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753, 762 (2d Cir. 2007).
278. United States v. Stein (Stein I1), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 397 (S.D.N.Y 2007) (citing United States v.
Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 721,737 (E.D. Va. 2007)).
279. 2006 WL 3066196 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that a company's decision to discontinue advancement of
attorneys' fees was a response to employee's conduct and a threat to embarrass company rather than a product of
government coercion).
[Vol. 21:341
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL ETHics
decision "scholarly but ultimately unpersuasive, ' 0 because the court "found no
support for [the Stein holding] either in the Supreme Court decisions cited in
Stein or in any appellate court decisions...
In general, when courts find state action on the part of ostensibly private actors,
they do so on grounds that: (1) the actor is really a creature of the state rather than
a private actor;282 (2) the actor is performing a public or inherently governmental
function; 283 (3) the government has become so pervasively entangled in private
activity that purportedly private conduct should be attributed to the state;284 or (4)
the government has encouraged or facilitated the challenged activity.285 Stein
illustrates application of the latter two categories.2 86 Long before the current
controversy arose, however, employees were raising state action claims based on
similar assertions in contesting the legality of workplace investigations. State
action arguments sometimes have been successful in the context of workplace
searches and alcohol and drug testing alleged to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.287 Claims pertaining to Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights have proven far
more difficult, however.288
In the particular context of United States v. Stein it was clear that KPMG's
decision was directly linked to the Thompson Memorandum and prosecutors'
refusal to back away from the threat inherent in the memorandum's provisions
with respect to support of culpable employees. 289 There may be other circum-
stances in which individuals are able to demonstrate that the government
interfered with an employer's advancement of counsel fees, but it seems unlikely
that a court would uphold such a claim in the absence of evidence of questionable
prosecutorial conduct directly related to the counsel fee provisions of the
Thompson or McNulty Memoranda. While Judge Kaplan condemned the impact
of the Thompson Memorandum on the balance critical to an adversarial system of
justice,29° he emphasized that KPMG prosecutors underscored the threat inherent
280. Id. at *2; see also Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 732-34 (questioning when right to counsel attaches in
decision denying defendants' constitutional claim on grounds of failure to show prejudice).
281. Stodder, 2006 WL 3066196 at *2.
282. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995) (holding that Amtrak is an agency
or instrumentality of the federal government and therefore subject to the First Amendment and that Congress
could not evade constitutional strictures on government entities by adopting the corporate form but maintaining
the power to control the entity it created). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 275, at 514-15.
283. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 275, at 518-19.
284. See id. at 527.
285. See id. at 532-538.
286. See United States v. Stein (Stein 11), 495 F Supp. 2d 390,414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
287. See generally MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES §§ 5.01-5.18
(2006); JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SErzuRt (3d. ed. 2000 & Supp. 2004).
288. Griffin, supra note 2, at 378; Marks, supra note 11, at 1090-91.
289. See supra Part I.C. Judge Kaplan noted that KPMG's approach was "something never heard of
before." United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F Supp. 2d 330,435 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
290. Stein !, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 351; Stein II, 495 F Supp. 2d at 427.
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in the memorandum, thereby exacerbating the problem.291 Moreover, at least part
of the conduct complained of by the individuals occurred after KPMG entered
into a deferred prosecution agreement with the government that mandated
ongoing cooperation, thereby strengthening the state action claim.29 2
Much of the impact of the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda, however,
occurs in circumstances in which the link between an employer's conduct and
federal policy is far less direct. An example involves interviews of individual
employees in the context of an internal investigation. When corporate counsel
undertake an internal investigation-whether in-house lawyers or attorneys from
an outside law firm handle the inquiry-the heart of the investigative process is
the interview stage.2 93 In most states employees face sanctions, including
termination, if they decline to cooperate with an investigation, yet they may be
unaware that by participating in an interview they may waive their Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination,294 or that they may even be
prosecuted for failure to speak truthfully.295 The rules of professional ethics
governing attorney conduct require investigating counsel to disclose the clients'
identity only when they have reason to believe a constituent misunderstands the
lawyer's role.2 96 This admonition, however, leaves room for the exercise of
considerable discretion, particularly because investigating counsel have no clear
obligation to warn employees that they may waive their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination by participating in investigative inter-
views.2 97
Individuals employed by the government-federal or state-do not face quite
so difficult a dilemma. In Garrity v. New Jersey298 the Supreme Court ruled that a
state's threat of dismissal or other significant economic sanction to persuade
individuals to waive the protection of the Fifth Amendment constituted unconsti-
291. Disputes in federal court Sixth Amendment claims pertaining to fee advancement sometimes arise in
connection with financial constraints related to seizure of corporate assets, thereby requiring a judicial ruling to
access corporate funds as a source of attorneys' fees for individual constituents otherwise entitled to
indemnification. The facts of Stein were quite different. See United States v. Galante, 2006 WL 3826701 (D.
Conn. 2006) (distinguishing Stein circumstances from matter in which government had frozen corporation's
assets and individual defendants sought to free assets for advancement of attorneys' fees pursuant to both Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and Fifth Amendment substantive due process claims).
292. Stein 1, 435 F Supp. 2d at 349-050.
293. See Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 891-92 & sources cited therein.
294. Id.
295. See Former Computer Associates Executives Indicted on Securities Fraud, Obstruction Charges,
FDCH Fed. Dept. and Agency Documents, REG. INTELLIGENCE DATA, Sept. 22, 2004, at 2-3; Alex Berenson,
Case Expands Types of Lies Prosecutors Will Pursue, N.Y. Thms, May 17, 2004, at C 1; Griffin, supra note 2, at
370-74.
296. MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr R. 1.13(f) (2007) [hereinafter MODEL RuLEs].
297. See infra Part IV.B.2.b.
298. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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tutional coercion. 299 The Garrity Court held that the government cannot
constitutionally coerce an employee to yield the protection of the Fifth
Amendment by threatening termination of employment, disbarment, or other
significant economic sanctions unless the government also offers the employee
immunity against the use of the coerced statements against her in a subsequent
criminal prosecution. 3° Courts, however, have proven reluctant to find state
action sufficient to extend the protection of the Fifth Amendment into the private
sector, even where there is an arguable connection between the government and
the conduct of private actors. 30 1 Recently, though, particularly since the June
2006 decision in United States v. Stein,30 2 some commentators have argued that
in certain contexts the Garrity principle should be extended to cover employees
interviewed in the course of internal corporate investigations.3 °3
Colin Marks, for example, has suggested that "[u]nder the Stein reasoning,
'deputized' counsel may violate an employee's constitutional rights by interview-
ing him. ' ' 3° 4 In another recent article, Lisa Griffin argues in favor of application
of the state action doctrine in the specific context of internal investigations
conducted in connection with deferred prosecution agreements.3 °5 Professor
Griffin reasons that when a corporation or other entity has entered into a deferred
prosecution agreement with the government, the government becomes "entwined
in the specific conduct leading to the deprivation of constitutional rights," 306 and
that "[s]tatements received under these circumstances are obtained through state
action. 307 Professor Griffin further argues that the constitutional issues created
by deferred prosecutions agreements requiring employers to engage in internal
investigations are exacerbated by recent prosecutions of employees interviewed
in internal investigation for obstruction of justice for concealing or failing to fully
disclose relevant knowledge.30 8 Consequently, she suggests that "employees
interviewed in the course of an internal investigation.., should enjoy immunity
analogous to the Garrity shield that protects public employees. ' 30 9 The argument
for extension of the Garrity doctrine is underscored by the indictments in recent
299. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98; see also Uniform Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Comm'r of Sanitation of
New York, 392 U.S. 280, 282-83 (1968).
300. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98.
301. See, e.g., United States v. Antonelli, 434 F.2d 335 (2d Cir. 1970) ) (declining to extend constitutional
protections to interrogation by private security guards).
302. In reaching his decision on state action, Judge Kaplan quoted Garrity v. New Jersey with respect to
economic coercion. See supra Part II.A.
303. See Griffin, supra note 2, at 353; Marks, supra note 11, at 1091-92.
304. Marks, supra note 11, at 1095.
305. Id.
306. Griffin, supra note 2, at 369.
307. Id. at 370.
308. Id. at 371.
309. Id. It is unclear, however, who would make the decision to extend use immunity, if applicable, or how
that decision would be made. The likely judicial remedy in most cases would be suppression, assuming that the
individual involved declined to plead guilty.
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years of employees on obstruction of justice charges on the basis of statements
made to corporate counsel in internal investigative interviews 310 in the high
profile Computer Associates case. In the Computer Associates matter the
government prosecuted senior executives on obstruction of justice charges based
on statements the executives made to outside counsel and auditors conducting an
311Prectrasinternal investigation. Prosecutors also charged the company's general counsel
with "proxy obstruction" pertaining to materials provided to auditors and
statements in press releases. 312 As Professor Griffin observes, the Computer
Associates defendants "were convicted of lying to prosecutors without ever
talking to them. 313
The argument for application of the Garrity analysis to internal investigations
makes sense in the context of deferred prosecution agreements, and perhaps in
other circumstances in which the government agrees to forego indicting an
organization on the basis of its cooperation in pursuing individual constituents. In
these circumstances the government both demands an investigation and antici-
pates receiving the information acquired through it in circumstances where
employees believe that they must speak or lose their livelihood.3 14 This situation
is arguably analogous to circumstances in which courts have applied the Fourth
Amendment to suppress the fruits of workplace searches on grounds that the
government's instigation of the search constituted state action.315 While Judge
Kaplan suppressed the statements of three KPMG defendants on analogous Fifth
Amendment due process and Sixth Amendment right to counsel grounds, it
remains to be seen whether other courts will follow suit.
316
Absent a deferred prosecution agreement, or other evidence of direct
government involvement in an internal investigation or decision with respect to
attorneys' fees, fashioning a compelling state action argument becomes vastly
more difficult. Consequently, much of the impact of federal corporate coopera-
tion policies on individuals results from the mere release of policy documents
such as the McNulty Memorandum in combination with information that
310. Indictment, United States v. Sanjay Kumar and Stephen Richards, No. 2004r02094 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
[hereinafter Kumar IndiQtment]. See generally Griffin, supra note 2; United States v. Computer Assocs. Int'l,
Inc., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, 1492 PLI/CoRp. 861, 864-66 (2005).
311. United States v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., Deferred Prosecution Agreement, 1492 PLI/CoRp. 861
(2005).
312. See Kumar Indictment, supra note 310, at paras. 72-73.
313. Griffin, supra note 2, at 373.
314. "The government's current approach [to corporate corruption] ... is both questionable policy and the
cause of significant unfairness." Id. at 379.
315. See Griffin, supra note 2, at 370-71.
316. In the context of an internal corporate investigation it would be difficult to provide use immunity
without direct prosecutorial involvement. Corporate counsel would not be in a position to extend immunity, nor
is it realistic to require a company that suspects an employee of breaking the law to refrain from yielding its
right to sanction or terminate an employee who refuses to assist an internal investigation. The more realistic
remedy would be suppression of any statements made by the employee, but it is questionable whether the courts
would go this far.
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government attorneys- are pursuing the strategies they outline. As Judge Ellis of
the Eastern District of Virginia has recognized, these policies may be constitution-
ally suspect.3 t7 It is unlikely, however, that a court would find that the mere
existence of the policies constitutes a basis for dismissing a criminal indictment.
2. THE LIKELIHOOD OF SIMILAR CASES IN FEDERAL COURT
Even if the Second Circuit were to uphold the dismissal of the KPMG
indictments and the courts were to prove receptive to extension of the Garrity
shield to private sector employees interviewed pursuant to deferred prosecution
agreements, the impact of the Holder-Thompson-McNulty approach ranges far
beyond the parameters of this kind of prosecutorial involvement. In many
instances, the damage done to individuals in the course of internal investigations
arises long before the government becomes directly engaged. In the current
enforcement environment, organizations regularly launch internal investiga-
31tions, 18 and when they do, disclosure to the government is possible, even
probable, if problems are uncovered.3 19 Perhaps even more importantly, litigating
these claims requires significant financial resources. Employees who are most at
risk-those without a basis to seek advancement of attorneys' fees or those
whose employers have decided not to advance fees to avoid the wrath of
prosecutors-are least likely to be able to afford to pursue appropriate relief.
320
In these instances, the pressure on individuals to enter into guilty pleas is
particularly strong.
3. THE IMPACT OF SPECIFIC JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON THE IN TERROREM EFFECT OF FEDERAL
CORPORATE COOPERATION POLICIES
DOJ made an effort to modify at least a portion of the McNulty Memorandum
in light of Judge Kaplan's Stein I ruling-perhaps in response to the court's
holding that the Thompson Memorandum was not narrowly tailored to accom-
plish a compelling objective. 3 21 As of this writing, however, DOJ has not made
any other visible efforts to tailor the provisions of its corporate cooperation
policies more narrowly. In any event, DOJ can choose not to modify national
policy on the basis of judicial decisions in a few jurisdictions. Absent a clear
trend, or a decision on the part of DOJ to change course, as Irvin Nathan has
pointed out, "Corporations are likely to be more influenced by the hope of
317. United States v. Rosen, 487 F. Supp. 2d 721, 737 (E.D. Va. 2007) (denying motions to dismiss
indictment because defendants failed to show prejudice as a resut of government's alleged interference with
their employers' payment of their counsel fees).
318. See, e.g., Kestenbaum & Criss, supra note 12, at 10,630; Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 884.
319. See, e.g., Deputizing Corporate Counsel, supra note 2, at 35-36.
320. See United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 362-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (finding that financial
constraints caused individual KPMG defendants to restrict their lawyers' activities).
321. See sources cited supra note 25.
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avoiding a corporate indictment than by eloquent court opinions about the
impropriety and unconstitutionality of government pressure against company
advancement of legal fees."322
In sum, Judge Kaplan's state action rulings in the KPMG prosecutions offer
some promise for application of the doctrine in the corporate cooperation context,
but the decision is unlikely to have a major impact in the near term. At best, the
state action doctrine offers a means of vindicating Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights for a limited number of individuals caught in the web of corporate
cooperation. While it is important to consider the possibility of state action in
every situation involving cooperation between the government and an employer
that infringes on an individual's freedom in one way or another, it is unlikely that
the Stein precedent will end the alliances of government and corporate authority
that so often result in the compromise of individual rights.323
III. THE DEBATE OVER THE "CRIMINALIZATION" OF CoRPoRATE LAW
Another long-disputed subject that has come to the fore in the midst of the
current controversy over federal corporate cooperation policies is the question of
the proper scope of corporate criminal liability. This is a topic that has stimulated
scholarly debate for decades. 324 However, the rapid expansion of business
prosecutions since 1990, followed by the public outcry for greater corporate
accountability since 2001, has focused renewed attention on the question
whether, and to what extent, corporations should be subjected to criminal
liability. While some commentators contend that the current reach of corporate
criminal liability is appropriate, others argue that the "criminalization" of
corporate law has gone too far. The following discussion offers a brief survey of
the relevant issues, with a particular focus on recent calls for redefinition of
corporate criminal liability.
A. THE "CRIMINALIZATION" OF CORPORATE LAW AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES
In its 1909 decision in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad v. United.
322. Irvin B. Nathan & Michael S. Lewis, The Thompson Memo Ruling-Recent Decision May Have Little
Effect on Other Cases, 14 No. 2 Bus. CiMEs BuLL. 1 (Oct. 2006).
323. As Preet Bharara points out, "The Stein court's rebuke of the government may portend little when
viewed against the larger, well-developed landscape ... [and] Stein is in spirit at odds with a century of
utilitarian Supreme Court decisions mostly deferential to law enforcement." Preet Bahara, Corporations Cry
Uncle and Their Employeers Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecution Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM.
CRs. L. REV. 52, 104-05 (2007)
324. Khanna, supra note 35; Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEo. L.J. 1743,
1773-74 (2005); Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75
MiNN. L. RE. 1095, 1102-03 (1991).
388 [Vol. 21:341
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL ETHics
States,325 the United States Supreme Court provided a conceptual framework for
holding corporations and other entities criminally liable for the misconduct of
their constituents. The particular issue in New York Central was the constitutional
authority of Congress to impose criminal liability on a corporation on the basis of
326 thdewrongdoing by its agents. ' In the decades that followed courts and legislatures
proved willing to expand the scope of corporate criminal liability to hold
organizations liable for individual misconduct that benefited, or potentially
benefited, the entity in virtually any way.327 In Gerhard Mueller's famous words,
"Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.
328
Corporate criminal liability grew, but it took several decades before prosecutors
began to harvest the fruits of the legal doctrine on a regular basis. As noted
earlier, it was not until the 1990s that federal prosecutors regularly set their sights
on holding corporations criminally accountable for constituent wrongdoing.32 9 In
recent years, however, as the Holder, Thompson and McNulty Memoranda
reveal, DOJ has relied heavily on the broad scope of corporate criminal liability
in pursuing corporate cooperation strategies.
330
Pursuant to current law, "a corporation may be criminally liable for almost any
crime except acts manifestly requiring commission by natural persons, such as
rape and murder.",33 ' The prerequisites to criminal liability for corporations are
few and relatively easy to establish.332 To hold the entity accountable an
employee or other agent must have acted within the scope of her employment.333
Neither intentional misconduct nor criminal intent on the part of the individual
precludes entity liability so long as one of the purposes of the employee's act or
omission was to benefit the corporation,334 even if that purpose was never
effectuated.3 35 Conversely, it is not necessary for any single constituent to have
the requisite criminal intent. Mens rea can be established pursuant to the
"collective entity" doctrine by showing that the entity's employees collectively
possessed the requisite knowledge, even if any one of them did not possess the
325. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
326. Id. at 492.
327. See BRicKEY, supra note 1, at § 4; Khanna, supra note 35, at 1488; see generally Peter J. Henning, The
Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of
Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1996).
328. Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation-A Study of the Model Penal Code Position in
Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. Prrr. L. REv. 21, 21 (1957); see also Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes,
Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STuD. 319, 320 (1996).
329. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
330. See Holder Memorandum, supra note 3, at *2-*3; Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, at *2-*3;
McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2-3.
331. See BpicKEY, supra note 1, at § 1.04.
332. Khanna, supra note 35, at 1488-89.
333. BRICKEY, supra note 1, at §§ 3.01, 3.04, 3.08; Khanna, supra note 35, at 1489.
334. BRICKEY, supra note 1, at §§ 3.01, 3.04, 3.08.
335. Id.
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requisite quantum of knowledge.336
B. THE CASE FOR NARROWING THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
For nearly a century commentators have debated whether broad corporate
criminal liability is necessary to hold business entities and other organizations
accountable.33 7 Some have questioned whether "we have done a poor job of
policing corporate misdeeds and have squandered the power of the criminal
law.' 338 Recently, a few observers have suggested that the controversy over the
McNulty Memorandum and similar policies is directly related to the broad scope
of contemporary corporate criminal liability.339 Larry Ribstein, for example,
suggests that the current structure of corporate criminal liability pressures both
corporate agents and prosecutors "to bend the rules and risks imposing
convictions based on misconceptions about business instilled by the media.
340
Preet Bharara takes a similar tack, suggesting that a century of expansive
jurisprudence in the corporate criminal liability field has both enabled prosecu-
tors to impose inappropriately broad liability on organizations and undercut the
defenses available to entities scrutinized by law enforcement authorities.341 In
Mr. Bharara's view, "efforts to reduce the risk of prosecutorial excess are, in the
long run, better directed at the source of prosecutors' leverage rather than at their
conduct., 342 Consequently, he suggests that narrowing the scope of corporate
criminal liability not only makes sense from a substantive law perspective, but
redefinition of corporate criminal liability offers the best means of restraining
336. Id. The notion of what constitutes a "collective entity" for purposes of corporate criminal liability has
expanded significantly in the nearly one hundred years since the New York Central ruling. See, e.g., Lance Cole,
Reexamining the Collective Entity Doctrine in the New Era of Limited Liability Entities-Should Business
Entities Have a Fifth Amendment Privilege?, 2005 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 4-13; Henning, supra note 327, at
826-29.
337. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, CorporateEthos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liability, 75
MiNN. L. REv. 1095, 1096-97 (1991); Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 833, 29 SW. L.J. 908, 908-14 (1975).
338. Bucy, supra note 324, at 1096-97; see also, e.g., Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking
Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L. J. 411, 412 (2007). ("Wholesale adoption of vicarious liability agency
principles flies in the face of the precepts that govern criminal liability.").
339. Bharara, supra note 323, at 54; Weissmann & Newman, supra note 338, at 416. See also Mark Robeck,
Amy Vazquez, & Michael E. Clark, Corporate Cooperation in the Face of Government Investigations, 17 No. 2
HtLTH LAW. 20,20-21 (2005) (discussing the evolution of corporate criminal liability, including the enactment
of the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000), the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a note, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2 and 78ff (2000 & Supp. 2004)), and the U.S. SENTE ING GuinELnES
MANUAL, app. C, amend. 422 (2004) in conjunction with federal corporate cooperation policies).
340. Larry E. Ribstein, The Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs, 2 J. Bus. L. & ThcH. 59, 69 (2007).
341. Bharara, supra note 323, at 54.
342. Id.
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overzealous prosecutors. 43
In another recent article, former DOJ Enron Task Force Director Andrew
Weissmann and David Newman cite the broad scope of criminal liability as the
reason the balance of power essential to our adversary system is askew.
344
Observing that the prevaiiling expansive view of corporate criminal liability has
given the government "virtually unfettered discretion to exact a deferred
prosecution agreement, ' 345 they argue that "[r]ethinking the standard for criminal
corporate liability will ... serve to correct an imbalance in power between the
government and a corporation facing possible prosecution for the action of an
errant employee.",346 They suggest that "[w]here a corporation has effective
policies and procedures to deter and detect criminal actions by its employees,
none of the legitimate concerns animating criminal corporate liability is
implicated., 347 Citing Supreme Court cases restricting the reach of civil liability
pursuant to civil rights statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Messrs. Weissmann and Newman propose undoing the imposition of vicarious
criminal liability.348 Specifically, they advocate "requiring the government to
prove the absence of an effective compliance program, as opposed to placing the
burden on a corporate defendant to establish as a defense that it had such a
program.
349
343. Id. at 86.
344. Weissmann & Newman, supra note 338, at 414. See also Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability
Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984); Baker, supra note 1.
345. Weissmann & Newman, supra note 338, at 414.
346. Id. Messrs. Weissmann and Newman argue that "unless one adopts the extreme view that merely
employing a person who commits a crime is a 'wrong' deserving of criminal punishment of the employer-a
view that has never been part of our shared values regarding criminal corporate law and has been rejected by law
enforcement and regulatory agencies--there is no organizational conduct deserving of criminal sanction." Id. at
412.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 412, 413 (citing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000 & Supp. H (2003)).
349. Id. at 416; cf Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 689 (1997) (discussing perverse effects of strict vicarious
corporate criminal liability on compliance incentives and suggesting that a composite approach combining both
strict and duty-based elements would improve compliance).
Samuel Buell, however, reaches a different conclusion on the basis of an analysis of the application of current
criminal procedure rules within organizations. Buell, supra note 5, at 1614, 1670. Professor Buell suggests that
the doctrinal framework of contemporary criminal procedure developed in a binary model of the individual and
the state that becomes problematic when applied to the tripartite model of individual, state and firm. Id. at 1626.
Professor Buell examines the ways in which the government uses employee statements coerced by employers
and negotiates with employers with respect to advancement of defense fees for employees. On the basis of his
exploration he concludes that (1) Congressional intervention in a form such as S. 186 is not appropriate; and (2)
that further reforms are needed but that abolition of the use of employer coerced statements is unnecessary. He
stresses that "criminal procedure should be thought of differently in the firm context" and that "[c]urrent public
debate about criminal procedure within the firm has produced some misguided proposals, such as to ban the
state from encouraging firms to pursue policies toward their employees and evidence in firms' control that as
long as state practices are appropriately guided and constrained, advance regulatory objectives without undue
cost." Id. at 26.
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C. CHANGES IN CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AS A VEHICLE FOR
ADDRESSING CONCERNS OVER THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE
COOPERATION POLICIES ON INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES
Arguments over the propriety of "criminalizing" corporate law reflect a
broader social struggle over how to limit the burgeoning power of major
corporations and other significant entities. 350 The issue is plain: Society needs to
find ways to hold organizations accountable for constituent wrongdoing and
ensure that these entities have powerful incentives to promote legal compliance
as well as the pursuit of profits. Nevertheless, there is clearly a link between the
criminalization of corporate law and the aggressive prosecutorial tactics embod-
ied in the Holder, Thompson and McNulty Memoranda. The expansion of
corporate criminal liability has provided prosecutors with powerful tools against
corporations and other entities and added another significant dimension to the
oft-repeated argument that imposing criminal liability on corporations is neither
economically rational nor socially desirable.
Even so, there are problems with the notion that redefinition of corporate
criminal liability will resolve the corporate cooperation controversy. First, even if
the legal and business communities were to band together in support of
narrowing the scope of corporate criminal liability, it is unlikely that the weed so
firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence could be uprooted quickly. Realisti-
cally, redefining the parameters of corporate criminal liability may be possible
over a period of years, but it is unlikely that courts and legislatures would more
quickly, even if persuaded of the need for change. This is particularly true in the
current environment given ongoing concerns over corporate corruption. More
than half of all Americans own corporate securities in one form or another.351 So
long as the public remains suspicious of major corporations and their managers,
movements to limit corporate criminal liability legislatively are unlikely to
garner much support,352 and the courts' ability to effect change currently is
constrained by thousands of federal and state statutes.
35 3
Second, even if legislatures and courts begin to revisit the question whether
350. See, e.g., ROBERT REICH, SUPERCAPITALISM 218 (2007).
351. The Investment Company Institute reports that in 2005, 50.3% of all American households and more
than 91.1 million investors owned some form of equity securities. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE &
SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA 44 fig. 48 (2005). In 1998, the last year for
which reliable statistics are available, approximately 52% of Americans owned stock outright through
mechanisms such as individual investment, mutual funds, pension plans, in comparison with 1% in 1900 and
13% in 1980. See THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL, THE FIRST MEASURED CENTURY: AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO TRENDS
IN AMERICA, 1900-2000, at 252-53 (2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/fmc/book/14business6.htm (last
visited Mar. 18, 2008).
352. See, e.g., Weissmann & Newman, supra note 338; see also Sarah Helene Duggin & Stephen M.
Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate Directors: The Disney Standard and the "New" Good Faith, 56 AM.
U. L. REv. 211, 259-63 (2006) (discussing "corporate trust crisis").
353. See Baker, supra note 1, at 546 (noting that more than 4000 criminal statutes apply to corporate
entities).
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corporate criminal liability has gone too far, redefining the reach of corporate
criminal law would be a lengthy process. There is no easy way to undo a doctrine
resting on a host of judicial decisions and legislative actions at the state and
federal level that have become entrenched in law enforcement policies. Change,
if it comes, will take considerable effort on many levels and a great deal of time.
It seems quite likely that the basic concept of corporate criminal responsibility
will remain a part of our legal system for many years to come.
Finally, so long as organizations can be held criminally liable in at least some
contexts there will be significant potential for infringement of individual rights in
any instance in which law enforcement authorities have the ability to turn entities
against their employees by raising the specter of criminal prosecution.
IV. THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE ETHIcs OF CORPORATE
COOPERATION
Whatever developments take place in the administrative, legislative, and
judicial arenas, the controversy surrounding corporate cooperation policies is
ultimately about the manner in which lawyers fulfill their obligations to entity
clients and how lawyers treat third 'parties in the process. An often overlooked
aspect of the current debate is that it is lawyers-and not FBI agents, SEC
investigators, or other law enforcement personnel-who have generated the
controversial policies at issue. Prosecutors forged corporate cooperation policies
in the midst of demands to hold corporate entities and other organizations
accountable, and these demands increased dramatically in the wake of the Enron
debacle and other major corporate financial scandals.
The pressure on prosecutors to obtain convictions of businesses and business
executives plays out in the personal as well as the public sphere. A fundamental
obligation of all prosecutors is to serve the ends of justice,354 but prosecutors do
not get ahead in the government, or further their own career ambitions, on the
basis of decisions not to prosecute.355 DOJ does not publish statistics about
declinations of prosecution on its website, and no former U.S. Attorney runs for
office on a platform of being "reasonable" about crime. Moreover, many innocent
people have been hurt by the corporate financial decades of the last several years,
and the public has demanded retribution from corporations and corporate
managers who have broken the legal rules on which our market economy rests.
We have made celebrities of business leaders,356 but, particularly in the
post-Enron world, it has become a popular pastime to follow the latest corporate
354. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
355. See Meese Testimony, supra note 5, at *2 (observing that "[t]he tension ... between obtaining
impressive conviction statistics and taking care to do justice has always confronted prosecutors and probably
always will").
356. For example, Martha Stewart and Donald Trump, to name just two.
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scandals and the sagas of Fortune 100 executives toppled from their corporate
thrones, sometimes to be led off to prison.357
Conversely, lawyers who represent corporations and other entities encounter
equally intense, albeit different, pressures.3  Corporate counsel have had to do
their work in an atmosphere in which indictment, or even a high profile
investigation, can cripple or destroy an organization.35 9 While the deference
accorded to compliance advice from corporate counsel has undoubtedly in-
creased in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley world, 3 ° corporate lawyers, especially
in-house counsel, must work hard to keep lines of communication with
employees open. Investigating counsel know that employees are likely to lose
their jobs for failing to cooperate, yet employees may waive important
constitutional protections if they respond to the investigating lawyer's questions.
Yet they must always keep in mind that their actual client is an abstract legal
fiction, and not the human beings with whom they work.361 Corporate lawyers
charged with responsibility for conducting internal investigations confront
difficult ethical issues, but there are ample rewards for serving up employees "to
the government on a silver platter., 362 As KPMG counsel Robert Bennett points
out, in the current law enforcement environment it is safer for companies not to
advance attorneys' fees to constituents whose conduct is under investigation 363-
even though all but the wealthiest individuals will face financial ruin if forced to
pay, on their own, for to defend against criminal charges in complex financial
cases. This is precisely why Judge Kaplan found the government's conduct
shocking to the conscience in the KPMG matter.3 64
Nor is it any answer to say, as have some who support federal corporate
cooperation policies, that innocent employees have no reason to fear.365
Scapegoating is a time-honored practice-an employer's decision not to advance
attorneys' fees affects the innocent as well as the guilty. More importantly, every
person is entitled to the protections of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments;
prosecutors should not enlist entity lawyers in circumventing these important
357. For a discussion of the fate of various deposed corporate executives who have been prosecuted, see
Kathleen Brickey, In Enron's Wake: Corporate Executives on Trial, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397 (2006).
358. See supra note 28 and sources cited therein.
359. For example, the fall of Arthur Andersen, despite the Supreme Court's subsequent reversal of the firm's
conviction. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
360. See Corporate Compliance: The Role of Company Counsel, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETics 491, 525-532
(2008) (remarks of Robert Lupone, Carol Rakatansky & Sung Hui Kim).
361. See MODEL RuLES R. 1.13(a); see, e.g., Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 934-36; Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J. 1011 (1997); George Reycraft, Conflicts of
Interest and Effective Representation: The Dilemma of Corporate Counsel, 39 HAsTINGS L.J. 605, 608 (1988).
362. See Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 36 & 44.
363. Robert S. Bennett, Alan Kriegel, Carl S. Rauh, and Charles F. Walker, Internal Investigations and the
Defense of Corporations in the Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 62 Bus. L. 55, 66 & n.29 (2006).
364. See supra Part I.B.2.
365. See supra Part II.D.3 (discussing comments of DOJ representatives and Professor Michael Siegel).
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constitutional guarantees. Nor should entity lawyers be required to assist the
government in circumventing the rights of employees in order to safeguard client
organizations. Law enforcement officials regularly identify people as criminally
culpable, but the Constitution requires prosecutors to prove their case before the
government imposes sanctions. An individual suspected of a business crime
should be entitled to the same protections as a person suspected of an assault or
murder. As Dick Janis has pointed out, current corporate cooperation policies
turn the presumption of innocence on its head, particularly because "in the
context of white-collar enforcement... often the conduct itself may be clear but
its legality (or illegality) is not.",
366
But lawyers are members of a self-governing profession.367 As partakers in
this privilege, lawyers have a say in how clients-including the government-
use their services.368 Our professional integrity requires us to define limits on
what we will and will not do in performing our duties. We will not, for example,
reveal client confidences except in extraordinary circumstances; 369 we will not
file frivolous lawsuits even to satisfy client demands; 370 and we will not lie to
tribunals or third parties on behalf of clients. 37 As a profession we also have the
ability and the responsibility to revise and clarify the basic tenets that govern the
practice of law whenever it becomes necessary to do so. While it takes time for
states to review these kinds of changes and to decide whether or not to adopt
them, in general the ABA, together with state and local bar. associations, has
tremendous influence in setting the ethical boundaries of the practice of law.
372
For example, in the wake of the Enron debacle the ABA revised Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 1.6 and 1.13 to emphasize the responsibilities of entity
counsel and to facilitate gate-keeping functions in appropriate circumstances.373
The legal profession needs to take steps to protect individuals caught in the
intricate web spun by prosecutors and employers seeking to avoid Arthur
Andersen's fate. Reasonable lawyers may disagree about the propriety of
366. Id.
367. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 18, at § 1.01; see also e.g., Michael S. Frisch, No Stone Left Unturned:
The Failure of Attorney Self-Regulation in the District of Columbia, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 325 (2005)
("Self-governance is a cherished and well-entrenched prerogative of the legal profession.").
368. See Report of the Am. Bar Ass'n Task Force on Corporate Responsibility (Mar. 31, 2003), available at
http:l/www.abanet.orglbuslawlcorporateresponsibility/fina-report.pdf.
369. See MODEL RuLES R. 1.6.
370. See MODEL RuLES R. 3. 1.
371. See MODEL RuLEs R. 3.4, 4.1.
372. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 18, at § 1.01; Report of the Am.Bar Ass'n Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility (Aug. 11-12, 2003), available at www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/journal/119b.pdf.
373. See Press Release, Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Adopts New Lawyer Ethics Rules, Urges Fairness in Military
Commission Trials (Aug. 12, 2003) (on file with author). The actual resolutions are available at http://
www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/j ournal/ 19b.pdf.
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corporate cooperation policies,37" but even proponents of the Thompson-
McNulty approach have noted the need to safeguard the constitutional rights of
individuals caught up in corporate investigations. 375 It is time to act.
A. THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN CREATING AND PERPETUATING THE
CORPORATE COOPERATION CONTROVERSY
The perception that conscientious lawyers must act aggressively to protect
client interests despite the costs to third parties raises particular concerns when
the client is a corporation capable of acting only through the human beings
associated with it. While we indulge the fiction that entities have an existence
separate and apart from their constituents, in reality organizations cannot act
without human agents. The notion of entities as legal persons incorporated into
contemporary corporate law and professional ethics appropriately leads to the
conclusion that diligent representation of an entity client requires lawyers to put
the entity's interests first.376 The question is where the boundary lies between the
ethical obligation to protect the entity's interests and the risk of unacceptable
unfairness to individuals.377 This quandary over where and how to draw the line
between diligent representation of a client and fairness to the interests of third
parties is not unique to lawyers involved in the corporate cooperation contro-
versy. The same dilemma infuses lawyer-client relationships in a wide variety of
areas.378 Nevertheless, at present the problem is particularly pointed for lawyers
who represent entities that wield great power over the lives and livelihoods of
their human constituents.
Whatever else is going on, the very diligence of prosecutors and corporate
counsel accounts for at least part of the problem. 379 The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), however, do not require lawyers to
engage in extreme tactics. Model Rule 1.3 provides that "[a] lawyer shall act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. ' 380 Comment 1
notes that "[a] lawyer must ... act with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf,"38 t but it.
374. See, e.g., Richman Testimony, supra note 123 (opposing legislative intervention to override McNulty
Memorandum); Siegel Testimony, supra note 123 (same).
375. See supra text accompanying notes 125-26.
376. See MODEL RuLES R. 1.13(a).
377. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DzIENKOwsiu, LEGAL EThics: THE LAWYER'S DESKBOOK
ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY § 1.13-2(d) (2007-2008).
378. For example, counsel investigating a crime, accident, or domestic dispute must often talk with
witnesses who may be confused about the lawyer's role or have interests adverse to her client.
379. Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 36 ("Given the low esteem in which the legal profession
is already held, is it any wonder that the lesson learned is 'don't trust the lawyers' and that lawyers representing
companies are held in contempt by the company's employees? Moreover it is worth noting that this
phenomenon makes it harder for the company to police itself and promotes distrust for the legal profession.").
380. MODEL RULES R. 1.3.
381. MODEL RLES R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
[Vol. 21:341
INDIVIDuAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL ETHIcs
also emphasizes that "[a] lawyer is not bound ... to press for every advantage
that might be realized for a client ... or preclude the treating of all persons
involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect., 382 In addition, standards
pertaining to government lawyers contain similar admonitions with respect to the
role of government attorneys. The federal government's Standards of Ethical
Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch begin with the reminder that
"[p]ublic service is a public trust, ' 3 8 3 and the ABA's Criminal Justice Standards
provide that "[t]he duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to
convict.
' 384
Despite these admonitions, hard-driving prosecutors-or those looking for
ways to lighten their workload-find effective tools in corporate cooperation
policies. 385 As earlier noted, particularly in the post-Enron era, DOJ representa-
tives repeatedly characterize the Department as tough on corporate crime and
aggressively engaged in rooting out corporate wrongdoing by entities and
managers.386 The notion that aggressive tactics are essential to effective
lawyering has contributed to an environment in which prosecutors may believe
that they have not acted diligently on behalf of the government unless they have
persuadedobtained at least some evidence of cooperation from a putative
corporate wrongdoers to "cooperate." The Veasey Report underscores this reality,
suggesting that in at least some instances line prosecutors ignore DOJ policies
requiring Main Justice approval for corporate cooperation demands.
3 87
By the same token, in light of both the current law enforcement environment
and applicable ethics standards, there are few situations in which a defense
lawyer could in good conscience refrain from urging a client entity to acquiesce
in government cooperation demands, no matter what the client's theoretical
rights.388 The costs are too high, as illustrated by the fate of Arthur Andersen. The
Supreme Court ultimately overturned the firm's conviction, but far too late to
save the company.3 89 Despite the premium placed on employee loyalty and the
efforts companies make to inspire allegiance in the workforce, 9 ° in the current
enforcement environment conscientious lawyers are almost always forced to
advise corporations to cooperate with the government. The employees then face
382. MODEL RULES R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (emphasis added).
383. U.S. OFFICE OF GOV'T ETHICs, STANDARDS OF CoNDuCr FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE ExECuTvE BRANCH
§ 2635.101(a) (1999).
384. STANDARDS FOR CRPMiNAL Jus'ncE, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3-1.3 (Am. Bar Ass'n 3d ed.
1993). For example, "[a] prosecutor should advise a witness who is to be interviewed of his or her rights against
self-incrimination and the right to counsel whenever the law so requires." Id. § 3-3.2(b).
385. See Baker, supra note 1, at 313; Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 34-35; Veasey Report,
supra note 165.
386. See supra Part I.B.1.
387. Veasey Report, supra note 165.
388. Siegel Testimony, supra note 123, at.5
389. Arthur Andersen, LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
390. Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 913-14.
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not only the awesome might of the federal government, but the combined power
of their government and their employer. "No longer foes, the corporation and the
government can team up to unmask the individuals who were at the center of the
criminal activity"39 '-or at least those they decide up front are "culpable." And it
is not just upper echelon employees who are at risk. Middle and lower level
employees also face perhaps even graver consequences because they may be less
sophisticated with respect to legal matters, and their financial resources are likely
to be more limited.392
Lawyers generally have not acted inappropriately or unprofessionally in the
corporate cooperation context given the standards that currently govern our
conduct. The impact of coporate cooperation policies on individuals, however,
should prompt us to ask whether there are at least some fundamental flaws in our
rules of ethics. As lawyers we are part of a profession that enjoys the privilege of
self-regulation. 393 While administrative policies, legislative measures, state
action doctrine, and the parameters of corporate criminal law and procedure are
all important, like the proverbial physician, we need to ask what we can do to heal
ourselves. Any one individual may have little ability to effect change, but as a
profession we can make a difference. In the longer run, we need to come to grips
with the reality that our rules may be becoming a bit dated. Now, more than ever,
a large percentage of lawyers represent corporate entities and constituents rather
than unaffiliated individuals. We need to recognize that a whole different set of
power dynamics applies when individuals are caught at the intersection of
government and corporate power-and that we may need to reorient our ethical
rules in response. However, in the near term, we can begin by considering a
variety of ethical issues, including the ways in which we define diligence,
standards for privilege waiver demands, fairness to employees in investigative
interviews, and the propriety of discouraging fee advancement.
The purpose of considering how ethical rules function in connection with
corporate investigations and criminal prosecutions is neither to denigrate
prosecutors who give their all to pursuing corporate crime nor to question the
response of corporate lawyers to the needs of entity clients facing the specter of
criminal prosecution. Ethical standards are not simply vehicles for sanctioning
conduct that exceeds agreed upon norms. They help us navigate dangerous
waters, and they provide an anchor to hold us firm in the crosscurrents that assail
391. See, e.g., Weissmann Testimony, supra note 11, at 2.
392. See Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 910-12; Tate, supra note 28, at 3-4. Moreover, in recent years,
the National Labor Relations Board has eliminated basic protections once -available to non-union employees.
See Sarah Helene Duggin, The Ongoing Battle Over Weingarten Rights for Non-union Employees in
Investigative Interviews: What Do Terrorism, Corporate Fraud, and Workplace Violence Have To Do With It?,
20 No'rE DAME J. L. Enmics & Pura. POL'Y 655 (2006) (discussing National Labor Relations Board's
termination of the right of non-union workers to have a co-worker present in investigative interviews where the
employee reasonably believes the interview may result in disciplinary sanctions).
393. See, e.g., Frisch, supra note 367, at 325.
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us in the practice of our profession. They remind us that there are boundaries we
should not cross, and they offer a way to explain to others why we cannot always
accede to their requests. Ethics rules also promote public understanding of a
lawyer's role and, properly designed, enhance public trust.
B. PROPOSALS TO REVAMP SPECIFIC RULES TO ADDRESS ISSUES RAISED
BY CORPORATE COOPERATION POLICIES
There are many avenues of approach to the ethical issues that infuse the
corporate cooperation controversy. The following discussion looks at a few of
these possibilities.394 It turns first to prosecutorial obligations under the Model'
Rules of Professional Conduct, then to provisions relevant to counsel involved in
internal investigations and other corporate defense work; itconcludes with a brief
discussion of the concept of diligent representation.
1. THE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROSECUTORS
As the United States Supreme Court has emphasized, and applicable ethics
standards reflect, the first duty of prosecutors is to seek justice.395 Prosecutors
also have particular obligations pursuant to the Model Rules. Model Rule 3.8(b)
is especially relevant to the corporate cooperation controversy. It provides:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the
right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable
opportunity to obtain counsel .... 396
As discussed below, the notions of fairness and justice inherent in Model Rule
3.8(b) pertain to issues related to both sanctions against employees-particularly
refusal to advance counsel fees-and the consequences of privilege waiver
demands.
394. For other discussions of these issues, see, e.g., Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 35-36;
Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 916-67; Marks, supra note 11, at 1086-98. See also Tanina Rostain, The
Emergence of Law Consultants, 75 FoRDnAm L. REv. 1397 (2006) (discussing law consulting model as a means
of "decoupling... legal expertise from traditional professional institutions.., in particular, those that attach to
the representation of clients").
395. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (noting that "[w]hile [a prosecutor] may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones").
396. MODEL RuLEs R. 3.8; cf Dexter, supra note 11 (suggesting modification of Model Rule 3.8 "to include
more constraints on a prosecutor's solicitation of evidence or testimony").
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a. The Impropriety of Discouraging Entities From Advancing Attorneys' Fees to
Constituents
Individuals identified as "culpable" by prosecutors investigating corporate
entities may not qualify as "accused" within the meaning of Rule 3.8, but they are
vulnerable to many of the same adverse consequences as persons actually
charged with crimes. The McNulty Memorandum, like the Thompson Memoran-
dum, requires prosecutors to pursue strategies that encourage corporations to
sanction individuals because they have been identified as "culpable" by
prosecutors. By encouraging companies to cease "support" of "culpable"
employees, DOJ policies prompt employers to sanction individuals without any
judicial or administrative determination of wrongdoing.397 While individuals in
this position have not yet been formally charged in a criminal "case," the damage
can be as great as that contemplated in Model Rule 3.8. As United States v. Stein
illustrates,398 a decision not to advance legal fees or to cut off payments once
begun can have devastating effects on an individual's ability to defend against
charges involving complex financial transactions. 399 While the McNulty Memo-
randum ostensibly limits the situations in which prosecutors may consider
advancement of legal fees as a negative factor in making charging decisions, the
climate created by the Thompson Memorandum still overshadows corporate
criminal investigations. Moreover, the McNulty Memorandum does not instruct
prosecutors unequivocally that they are to refrain from considering advancement
of legal fees as evidence of an uncooperative attitude.4 °°
Pressure on organizations to cut off legal fees to employees involved in
criminal investigations may not violate the letter of Model Rule 3.8(b), but it is
certainly contrary to the rule's spirit. When the government discourages an
employer from paying an employee's counsel fees, it effectively calls upon the
employer to impose severe financial hardship on individuals because they have
chosen to exercise constitutional rights. It is hard to imagine any legitimate basis
for doing so. State laws establish standards for indemnification, including
payment of counsel fees. Inappropriate advancement of legal fees is a matter to
be dealt with by boards of directors and shareholders, not by prosecutors. If the
government's point is that defense counsel file frivolous motions or otherwise
engage in improper litigation tactics, the appropriate remedy is to seek judicial
397. As Richard Janis and Andrew Weissmann have noted, in this regard DOJ has failed to exercise restraint
on the conduct of line prosecutors, instead encouraging, in the words of Mr. Janis, "a state-sponsored
shakedown scheme in which corporations are extorted to pay penalties grossly out of proportion to any actual
misconduct." Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 34; see Weissmann Testimony, supra note 11.
398. The relevant opinions are discussed in Part [I supra.
399. See United States v. Stein (Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Stein (Stein
I), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
400. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3; see generally Much Ado About Nothing, supra note 25, at
text accompanying notes 22-23.
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sanctions or invoke the provisions of the applicable state counterparts of Model
Rules 3.1 through 3.5. As noted earlier, Mr. McNulty has suggested that
advancement of attorneys' fees could be part of an effort to impede a criminal
investigation 40 '-but the same argument could be made any time someone
retains defense counsel. Defense counsel interfere with the ability of prosecutors
to obtain quick and easy convictions.4 °2 This is part of the cost of an adversary
system, but it is the system quite clearly guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.
When the government considers advancement of legal fees as a negative factor
in corporate charging decisions, the practical effect is to deprive individuals of
the means of obtaining the kind of legal representation essential to the defense of
complex cases. Major corporate prosecutions involve many witnesses, innumer-
able documents, and myriad facts and figures that require extensive analysis.4 °3
Without the funds to obtain appropriate legal assistance the KPMG defendants
were unable to defend themselves in any meaningful way. In the context of a
multi-million dollar financial fraud case-or a multi-billion dollar matter such as
the KPMG tax fraud prosecution-the sheer number of hours counsel must
devote to understand the case makes it difficult, if not impossible, for many
individuals to mount a defense without an employer's advancement of counsel
fees. This is particularly true when the accused individuals have lost their jobs, or
they are middle managers or lower echelon employees rather than senior
executives. 4  Other cooperation policies that discourage corporations from
sharing information with individuals under investigation or entering into joint
defense agreements with them compound the difficulty.40 5 Former Deputy
Attorney General Larry Thompson may well be correct that "there are lots of
reasonably priced lawyers, ' 4 ' but reviewing thousands, or even millions, of
pages of documents costs a great deal even if the charge is fifty dollars an hour
rather than several hundred. Ethical standards should not permit prosecutors
deliberately to interfere with the ability of an unrepresented person to obtain
counsel with the resources necessary to mount an effective defense. As Judge
Kaplan recognized, the government's attempt to do so is inconsistent with the
mords of a society that prides itself on dispensing justice under law.4 °7
401. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3, at 11 n.3; McNulty Testimony, supra note 97, at 4.
402. See Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 44 (suggesting that DOJ's real concern is "that
employees who have capable defense counsel will be more difficult to coerce into pleading guilty and
'cooperating,' and may actually put the government to the test of a trial of often dubious theories of criminal law
that the company itself cannot risk testing").
403. See, e.g., Stein 1, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 371 (observing that the "government has spent years investigating
the KPMG case, presumably reviewing millions of pages of documents and interviewing scores of witnesses")
404. See Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 910-12.
405. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3, at 11; Thompson Memorandum, supra note 3, at 10-11.
406. See supra text accompanying note 115.
407. See United States v. Stein (Stein 11), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390,427 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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b. Respect for the Rights of Employees Interviewed in the Course of Internal
Investigations
Ethical issues also arise with respect to the conduct of internal corporate
investigations. If a prosecutor interrogated an individual whose conduct was the
subject of a criminal investigation without providing a Miranda warning,
40
8
statements made in the course of the interview would be subject to exclusion in a
subsequent prosecution.4°9 In the employment context, at some point the
government's involvement should require a Garrity analysis.410 But even without
government involvement significant enough to create congnizable state action,
the interviewee might well react very differently to questioning by a prosecutor
rather than a lawyer representing his or her employee.411 Consequently, when
prosecutors encourage employers to interview employees-or require them to
conduct internal investigations pursuant to deferred prosecution agreements or
other special arrangements-the government invites, and even encourages,
vicarious violation of interviewees' Fifth Amendment rights.
In an environment in which a "culture of waiver" prevails,412 the danger that
employees will inadvertently waive Fifth Amendment rights or believe that they
have no choice but to do so is even greater.413 Consequently, prosecutors should
be ethically required to refrain from encouraging employers to violate employ-
ees' constitutional rights in this manner. This goal could be accomplished in
several ways. One approach would be to enlarge the scope of Model Rule 3.8 to
encompass corporate investigations, or to add a comment clarifying that
prosecutors should use good faith efforts to ensure that persons questioned in the
course of internal investigations conducted by agreement with the government
are warned that their statements may be turned over to prosecutors and used
against them in a criminal prosecution.4 14
408. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that admissibility of statements obtained by
police in the course of custodial interrogation would depend on provision of adequate warning to accused); see
also Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000).
409. See Meese Testimony, supra note 5, at 3 (observing that "[w]hen an individual's constitutional rights are
implicated the government may not do indirectly-through others-what it is forbidden to do directly").
410. See Griffin, supra note 2, at 365.
411. Employee Interview, supra note, at 910-11; see also Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at
35-36; Zomow & Krakaur, supra note 2, at 157.
412. See, e.g., Mathis March 2007 Testimony, supra note 9, at 6.
413. See sources cited supra note 12.
414. See Corporate Compliance: The Role of Company Counsel, 21 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmIcs 491, 508-511
(2008) (remarks of N. Richard Janis). For other examples of suggested warnings exceeding the bare minimum,
see Bennett, et al., supra note 131, at 71; Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 941-64 & 958-60; Marks supra
note 11, at 1090.
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2. ETHIcAL OBLIGATIONS OF CORPORATE COUNSEL4 15
a. Conditions on Advancement of Counsel Fees to Constituents
As noted above, Judge Kaplan's dismissal of the indictments against thirteen
of the KPMG defendants rested principally on the court's conclusion that the
government had interfered with KPMG's longstanding practice of advancing
counsel fees to its partners and employees.416 In addition to the state action
question, this issue raises ethical dilemmas for corporate defense counsel as well
as for prosecutors. Model Rule 1.8 specifically addresses the potential for conflict
when someone other-than the client pays for an attorney's services. Subsection
1.8(f) provides:
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other
than the client unless:
(1) the client gives informed consent;
(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional
judgment or with the lawyer-client relationship; and
(3) information relating to the representation of a client is protected as required
by [the client confidentiality provisions] of Rule 1.6.
The critical issue with respect to the advancement of counsel fees. to
individuals in the corporate cooperation context pertains to interference with the
lawyer-client relationship. While the McNulty Memorandum at least ostensibly
limits the occasions when prosecutors are permitted to hold advancement of
counsel fees to employees against an entity,418 the risk remains that prosecutors
will find ways around these limitations. If so, even in the absence of a direct
threat, organizations will still refuse to advance counsel fees to employees to
avoid the risk of invoking prosecutorial wrath.41 9 This kind of enforcement
environment invites companies to look for creative alternatives. KPMG, for
example, advanced pre-indictment counsel fees so long as recipients cooperated
fully with the government.420 Conditioning fee advancement on the recipient's a
priori agreement to cooperate with prosecutors arguably does not violate Model
Rule 1.8 because the condition is placed on the client rather than counsel.
Consequently, it does not interfere with the lawyer's independent professional
415. As used herein, "corporate counsel" includes both inside and outside counsel.
416. See United States v. Stein (Stein II), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Stein
(Stein 1), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
417. MODEL RULEs R. 1.8(0; see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusncE, The Defense Function, Standard
4-3.5(e) (Am. Bar Ass'n 3d ed. 1993).
418. See McNulty Memorandum, supra note 3, at 11.
419. See, e.g., Mathis March 2007 Testimony, supra note 9, at 6; Much Ado About Nothing, supra note 25, at
5.
420. Stein I1, 495 F.Supp.2d at 395; Stein 1, 435 F Supp. 2d at 360.
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judgment or with the attorney's relationship with the client per se. 4 21 Even so,
such a condition effectively prevents the client from accepting any advice against
cooperating unless he or she is prepared to assume the financial burden of paying
counsel fees, a situation that surely interferes with the attorney-client relationship
in a very real way.
Given the circumstances of the KPMG matter, if the firm had not found a way
to condition advancement of attorneys' fees on cooperation with the government,
it seems clear that KPMG would have declined to pay counsel fees or cut off
payment in short order once prosecutors indicated their concern about advance-
ment of fees to the individuals. The approach KPMG followed permitted the firm
to pay for at least some of the crushing defense costs faced by former partners and
employees. Even so, this benefit came with a significant price tag, one that the
individuals later had cause to regret. However well-intentioned, KPMG's
approach was inherently coercive.422
It is quite likely that KPMG's approach was the product of advice of its own
counsel, advice that appears to have worked well for the firm itself.4 23 In any
event, while while the KPMG rulings may cause prosecutors to pause in future
investigations, defense lawyers could well advise corporate clients to follow a
similar approach in the future. Consequently, it is worth considering whether
Model Rule 1.8(f) or the accompanying commentary should take a position on
the propriety of advising entities to condition advancement of counsel fees on
constituents' willingness to follow a particular course of action. To permit
lawyers to advise conditioning payment of legal fees on restrictions placed on a
client's ability to follow her counsel's advice surely defeats one of the principal
purposes of the rule.
b. Fairness to Corporate Employees in Internal Investigations
For corporate counsel, one of the hardest aspects of conducting or participating
in internal investigations is dealing with corporate constituents in investigative
interviews. Few tasks are more difficult in the current enforcement environment.
As Richard Janis points out, lawyers conducting internal investigations
must make it clear to employees that they represent the company and not the
individual employees to whom they are speaking. But in their role as deputy for
the Department of Justice, and in order to serve their client in the name of
421. MODEL RULES R. 1.8(0(2).
422. See supra Part 1H (discussing Judge Kaplan's rulings in Stein I, II, and. II).
423. On January 2,2007, the court entered an order of nolle prosequi without prejudice as to the information
filed against KPMG LLP. United States v. KPMG LLP, No. SI 05 CR 888 (LAKP) (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 2,2007). See
United States v. KPMG LLP, 2007 WL 541956 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 15, 2007).
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cooperation, they need to extract as much information as possible to curry favor
with the government so that the company can be seen as cooperative.4 24
Balancing these competing tensions is never an easy task. As I wrote several
years ago, and continue to believe today, there are times when any individual will
find it difficult to hear a warning, no matter what is said, in the context of an
internal investigation.4 25 There are also times when simple actions, or the manner
in which cautionary statements are delivered, can impact how an employee
responds far more than the words themselves.42 6 This is particularly true when
lawyers with whom individual employees have a longstanding relationship--
e.g., in-house counsel or attorneys from law firms that have handled other matters
for the company-serve as investigating counsel or accompany those who act in
this role.4 27 Nevertheless, appropriate warnings are important.
The provisions of the Model Rules most relevant to investigative interviews
are found in Model Rules 4.1, 4.3, 4.4, and 1.13. Model Rule 4.1 addresses
truthfulness in statements to others and prohibits lawyers from "mak[ing] false
statements of material fact or law to a third person. 4 28 The comments to the rule,
however, emphasize that, a lawyer "generally has no affirmative duty to inform
an opposing party of relevant facts, 429 and that "[wihether a particular statement
should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances., 4 3 o
Model Rule 4.3 focuses on fairness in a lawyer's dealings with third parties.
The rule sets forth three key requirements. First, a lawyer must not imply to a
third party that he or she "is disinterested." Second, a lawyer who "knows or
reasonably should know that [an] unrepresented person misunderstands the
lawyer's role in the matter ... shall make reasonable efforts to correct the
misunderstanding." Third, lawyers. are not to give legal advice to the unrepre-
sented person, other than the advice to obtain counsel, except where "the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person are or have a
reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.,
431
Model Rule 4.4 mandates respect for the rights of persons other than one's
client43 2 and admonishes that lawyers must not "use methods of obtaining
evidence that violate the legal rights of' third persons.4 33
Finally, Model Rule 1.13(f) addresses issues of truthfulness and fairness in
particular situations in which corporate counsel deal with the human constituents
424. Deputizing Company Counsel, supra note 2, at 35.
425. Employee Interview, supra note I, at 956.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. MODEL RuLEs R. 4.1(a).
429. MODEL RULES R. 4.1(a) cmt. 1.
430. MODEL RuLE R. 4.1(a) cmt. 2.
431. MODEL RuLEs R. 4.3
432. Model Rule 4.2 addresses contact with persons represented by other counsel.
433. MODEL RULES R. 4.4(a).
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of the entities they represent. It requires a lawyer to "explain the identity of the
client when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the organization's
interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is
dealing. 434
The net import of these various provisions is that counsel conducting
interviews of current or former employees as part of a corporate investigation
must inform the interviewee of who they represent when they have reason to
believe that confusion and/or adversity of interests exists. 435 Jurisdictions vary in
their particular approaches to the issue, but an ethics opinion issued by the Bar of
the District of Columbia in 1997 is often cited as an example of a relatively
expansive interpretation of the rule's disclosure requirements.436 This opinion
mandates disclosure of counsel's role "when the corporation has not yet
irretrievably committed itself to a position in the matter, but where one such
position might be adverse to the employee.', 437 Even with this guidance,
however, the determination of what kind of disclosure is required and when is
extremely difficult.
Many commentators advise providing at least some form of what is commonly
termed a "corporate Miranda warning. 438 They do so for two reasons. First, in
the absence of such a warning there is a risk that a court will hold that an
attorney-client relationship was established with the interviewee,439 and, second,
there is a sense that to skip this kind of warning would be unfair." Thus, practice
434. MODEL RULES R. 1.13(0.
435. Marks, supra note 11, at 1088; Employee Interview, supra note 1, at 946-47.
436. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm, Op. 269 (1997). The opinion cautions that adversity may arise "even
when the corporation has not yet irretrievably committed itself to a position in the matter, but where one such
position might be adverse to the employee." Id. But, because the duty arises only when potential adversity is
"apparent," "the obligation of disclosure would not arise in those situations where the lawyer had no reason to
believe that there was any possibility of adversity between corporation and employee when the interview was
conducted." Id. This standard leaves considerable room for interpretation in the context of an internal
investigative interview, particularly when investigating counsel has little prior knowledge of the circumstances
or the interviewee's role. The opinion makes clear, however, that "[w]hile a lawyer's obligation to represent a
client zealously (Rule 1.3(a)) might suggest that the client's need for information from the constituent is the
lawyer's only concern, the Rules specifically require that the lawyer be mindful of the interests of the
constituent." Id.
437. Id.
438. See, e.g., Bennett, et al., supra note 131, at 65-68. One federal judge has proposed the term Adnarim
(Miranda spelled backwards) warnings for cautionary statements delivered to employees in the course of an
internal investigations. Frederick B. Lacey, Remarks on Employee Interviews (reprinted in Denis J. Block &
Nancy E. Barton, Internal Corporate Investigations: Implications of the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CoRORATE INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 271, at 40); Employee Interview, supra
note 1, at 941-47 & sources cited therein; Marks, supra note 11, at 1090-98 and sources cited therein.
439. See, e.g., Waggoner v. Snow, Becker, Kroll, Klaus & Krauss, 991 F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding
interviewee's right to invoke attorney-client privilege because she reasonably believed that firm's attorney was
also acting as her personal attorney).
440. Cf Cummings, supra note 11, at 673-74 (discussing human dignity and rights-based approach to
warnings concerning attorney-client privilege) (citing MONROE FREEDMAN, LAwYERs' ETHIcs IN AN ADvERARY
SYSTEM 4 (1975) and DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTIcE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 197 (1988)).
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has outdistanced the rule, at least for many lawyers experienced in this work. 4 '
Even so, Rule 1.13(0, and possibly Rule 4.1, should be amended to require that,
at a minimum, lawyers must inform constituents of their role, their representa-
tion, and the possibility that the client will disclose the discussion whenever an
internal investigation has commenced. This would help to ensure consistency by
clarifying the ethical dimensions of investigative interviews.
In addition, serious consideration should be accorded to specifying that
lawyers conducting internal interviews should warn the employees they inter-
view that what they say may be used against them," 2 particularly in circum-
stances in which there is a deferred prosecution agreement or other arrangement
with the government that requires the company to conduct an internal investiga-
tion and deliver its fruits to government attorneys. In such circumstances,
investigating counsel should reveal this fact and indicate the potential conse-
quences of a misrepresentation. on the part of the interviewee., Including this kind
of provision in the ethical rules would not simply restrict defense counsel, it
would free them to act in accordance with the same kinds of standards that led to
the Miranda rule itself. Such an ethical standard is entirely appropriate in
situations in which investigating counsel are acting as de facto government
agents. The criminal justice system has managed to proceed with the Miranda
requirement, and it will undoubtedly survive if corporate counsel are ethically
bound to provide a similar warning in the context of internal investigations. The
critical point is that the current Model Rules are too vague to ensure fairness to
individuals interviewed in the course of corporate investigations. The legal
profession needs to consider how to redress the imbalance created by this
situation.
3. DILIGENCE ON THE PART OF ALL COUNSEL
Model Rule 1.3 requires a lawyer to "act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client." 443 As noted earlier, Model Rule 1.3 does not
obligate lawyers "to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client,"
"require the use of offensive tactics[,] or preclude the treating of all persons
involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect." 444 It remains unclear,
however, what diligence means for prosecutors and defense attorneys in
connection with corporate cooperation, particularly with respect to the conduct of
internal investigations, government requests for waiver of corporate attorney-
client and work product protections, and the treatment of individual employees. It
441. See sources cited supra note 438. But see Cummings; supra note 11, at 670 (noting temptation to
provide "watered down warnings").
442. See Lacey, supra note 438.
443. MODEL RULES R. 1.3.
444. MODEL RULE R. 1.3 cmt 1.
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would be impractical, even undesirable, to attempt to address each of these
concerns specifically in the context of ethical rules, but some clarification could
help both prosecutors and corporate defense counsel.
Once again, the critical question is where to draw the line between diligence on
behalf of the government or a client entity and fairness to constituents. In the
wake of Enron's collapse and the series of corporate scandals that rocked the
corporate world thereafter, the President, Congress, and the public, as well as the
vast majority of business leaders interested in the honesty and fair dealing
essential to maintaining a level playing field, focused on preventing future
problems of this ilk. It was in this context that DOJ released the Thompson
Memorandum to expand on the principles set forth in the Holder Memorandum
and make them mandatory for prosecutors considering charging corporations. 4 5
It was also during the same time period that the ABA created its Corporate
Governance Task Force and amended Model Rules 1.13 and 1.6 to ensure that
corporate lawyers understand that the interests of the entities they represent take
precedence over those of constituents and to facilitate up-the-ladder reporting of
constituent wrongdoing. 46
The 2003 amendments to Model Rules 1.13 and 1.6 were connected to
resolutions pertaining to the role of lawyers in corporate representation, but the
ABA has yet to modify the Model Rules in connection with resolutions opposing
corporate cooperation policies that undermine the attorney-client privilege and
encourage entities to withhold advancement of counsel fees or otherwise sanction
employees for exercising constitutional rights." 7 As a profession we need to
consider how to take steps to address the issues raised by the 2005 and 2006
resolutions pertaining to corporate attorney-client privilege protections and the
impact of the culture of waiver and associated corporate cooperation policies on
individuals. Consideration of additional comments discussing the application of
Rule 1.3 in connection with corporate investigations would be a good place to
start.
C. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS
In the era of globalization, economic power crosses borders far more easily
than political influence, and the economic well being of hundreds of millions of
people depends on major corporations. In the United States alone more than half
of the population owns stock in one form or another"' and tens of millions of
445. See supra text accompanying notes 42-5 1.
446. See Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, supra note 368.
447. See ABA Attorney-Client Privilege Resolution, supra note 11; ABA Employee Rights Resolution,
supra note 69.
448. See supra note 351.
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Americans are employed by corporations and other business entities." 9 Yet, to a
large extent, the Model Rules have just begun to come to grips with the ways in
which organizations affect both lives and legal practice. 0 While it is true that
most ethical rules should apply to lawyers acting in any capacity, as a profession
we still have work to do in recognizing the importance of organizations in
contemporary practice.455 This is a point in-house lawyers have been making for
years.
In suggesting the need to reconsider ethical standards relevant to corporate
cooperation and the ways in which they operate, or fail to operate, to safeguard
individual rights, I do not mean to propose undermining the ability of prosecutors
to hold corporations and their constituents accountable. Nor do I suggest that
corporate counsel should lose sight of the reality that the entity itself is the
ultimate client. My goal is to point out that, in addition to seeking other avenues
of mitigating the unfairness of corporate cooperation policies to individual
employees and diminishing the difficulties faced by corporate counsel caught
between fidelity to client interests and unfair compromise of individual rights, the
legal profession needs to consider amending its own ethical standards.
V. CONCLUSION
Federal corporate cooperation policies profoundly impact the rights of
individuals caught up in the investigation and prosecution of corporations and
other organizations. A multifaceted approach encompassing administrative,
legislative and judicial action is necessary if meaningful changes are to occur, but
it may not be sufficient. As lawyers, it is also incumbent upon us to safeguard
individual rights by considering the ethical dimensions of corporate criminal
practice. In the end, it is integrity that is at stake-our own ethical grounding and
that of our profession.
449. See United States Census Bureau, Statistics of U.S. Businesses, Number of Finns, Number of
Establishments, Employments and Annual Payroll by Employment Size of the Enterprise for the United States
and States, Totals-2005 (2005), http://www2.census.gov/csd/susb/2005/usstO5.xls.
450. The necessity of acknowledging the importance of the ethical rules of other countries is already quite
clear. See, e.g., Ethan S. Burger, International Legal Malpractice: Not Only Will the Dog Eventually Bark, It
Will Also Bite, 38 ST. MARY's L. J. 1025 (2007) (underscoring the need to clarify our own professional
standards).
451. The Model Rules focus more on the role and ethical obligations of lawyers engaged in adversary matters
rather than advisory capacities. Too often mistakes occur because lawyers acting in an advisory capacity fail to
recognize the distinction between zealous advocacy and advice work in which common sense suggests a
different, less aggressive approach. This is particularly true for lawyers who serve as in-house counsel and for
all attorneys who advise corporations and other entities. The guidance offered by the Model Rules in theses
areas is limited.
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